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2003 MOOT COURT COMPETITION
BENCH MEMORANDUM
TERRY FERNBACH*

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL
ALEXANDER TEKHEAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

)

)
)
)

)

ALLAN DOSPAM,

No. 03-SC-0035

)

)

Defendant-Appellee.

I.

)

INTRODUCTION

This case is an appeal by Plaintiff-Appellant Alexander Tekhead
("Tekhead") and a cross-appeal by Defendant-Appellee Allan Dospam
("Dospam") from the order of the First District Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Farbrook County Circuit Court granting Dospam's Motion for Summary Judgment in case number 02-CV-6245.1
The Circuit Court denied Dospam's jurisdiction claim, but awarded
summary judgment on the ground that Tekhead had failed to state a
claim for false light invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion. In its
ruling on appeal, the First District addressed assignments of error related to these three issues. As to jurisdiction, the First District held that
* Terrence Fernbach earned his J.D. from DePaul University College of Law in 2000,
and earned his LL.M. in Information Technology and Privacy Law at the John Marshall
Law School in 2002. He served on the problem committee and acted as a Judge in the John
Marshall Law School 2003 Information Technology Law Moot Court Competition. He is
currently an Associate at Daniel Suber & Associates.
1. See Record ("R") at 2, 11.

248

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

Dospam was subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Marshall pursuant
to MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 735 MRC 25-302.2 On the issue of false
light invasion of privacy, the First District held that the false light was
not made publicly, and thus, was not actionable. 3 Finally, on the issue of
intrusion upon seclusion, the First District found that while the intrusion by Dospam was unauthorized, the information gathered was not private, and the intrusion claim was not actionable. 4 On these bases, the
5
First District affirmed on all three issues.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The undisputed facts follow. Beginning in 2000, Tekhead was employed at Distress Technologies ("Distress"), a software manufacturer in
Digital, Marshall, as a Customer Support Representative. 6 Distress terminated Tekhead in 2002 for violation of Distress' Employee Handbook,
7
among other reasons.
A.

DISTRESS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK

Upon hiring a new employee, Distress provides each new employee
with the Employee Handbook ("Handbook"). 8 The Handbook delineates
Distress' policies with respect to the workplace. Among these policies,
the Handbook presents the established guidelines for employee computer
use. The relevant guidelines to this action provide that an employee may
not (1) use Distress' computers for any personal use; (2) use Distress'
computers to retrieve, store, or view offensive, obscene or threatening
content; or (3) use any equipment in a manner that is excessive, loud or
disturbing to other employees. 9 While the Handbook makes clear that
Distress will not actively monitor the use of computers by employees, it
also provides that Distress will respond appropriately in such circumstances where it becomes aware of conduct violating computer use guidelines. However, the Handbook specifically states that the use of any of
Distress' computers to retrieve, store, or view obscene material can result in immediate termination. 10
2. See
3. See
4. See
5. See
6. See
7. See
8. See
9. See
10. See
T4(A)(5).

R. at 8-9.
R. at 9-10.
R. at 10.
R. at 11.
R. at 2.
R. at 2, 5.
R. at 3.
id.
Exhibit A (Distress Technologies, Inc. Electronic Information Systems Policy),
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B.

TEKHEAD'S EMPLOYMENT AT DISTRESS

On June 20, 2000, Distress hired Tekhead. On December 6, 2000,
Tekhead received his initial performance review. Even though comments from his supervisors stated Tekhead was a bit of a slacker and
prankster, his supervisors did note Tekhead has a high level of skill and
good potential if appropriately directed. 1 However, in a June 2001 performance review, Tekhead's supervisors noted a regression in Tekhead's
performance, and Tekhead explained that his shoddy work performance
was the result of interference of non-work related problems, which had
12
since been eliminated.
After his June 2001 review, Tekhead became an exemplary employee. Tekhead excelled at his job, gained positive reviews from his supervisors, and received a recommendation for an "Employee of the
Month" award in April 2002.13
1.

The Incident Giving Rise to Contested Claims- the June 13, 2002
E-mail

On June 13, 2002, one week before his upcoming performance review, Tekhead received an e-mail message ("June 13 E-mail") with the
subject line "Documents Relating to Upcoming Review." 14 Since the
June 13 E-mail identified a member of Distress' senior management as
its sender, Tekhead opened the e-mail, believing it related to his upcom15
ing performance review.
After Tekhead opened the June 13 E-mail, an animated image of a
nude George and Jane Jetson dancing the fandango appeared on his
computer screen. In addition, his computer began to repeat the phrase
"ALERT! STOP VIEWING PORN! CLOSE YOUR BROWSER IMMEDIATELY!" at maximum volume through the external speakers attached to
his computer. 16 While Tekhead unsuccessfully attempted to close the
June 13 E-mail, Tekhead's co-workers began to converge around his computer, including Tekhead's supervisor.' 7 After unsuccessfully shutting
down the audible and visual display with the computer's keyboard,
Tekhead's supervisor resorted to terminating the computer's power supply to end the display.' 8 Tekhead's supervisor thereafter directed
Tekhead to leave for the remainder of the day, and on the following day,
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

R. at 3, 4.
R. at 4.
id.
id.
id.
R. at 5.
id.
id.
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June 14, 2002, Distress' general counsel telephoned Tekhead and informed him that he had been discharged. 19
2.

The Employment Action

Tekhead filed a lawsuit against Distress for wrongful termination,
alleging that he had not willfully violated Distress' Employee Handbook. 20 Tekhead also filed a motion to preserve the electronic evidence
in Distress' possession, namely Tekhead's computer, Distress' e-mail
server, and all backup tapes for June 13, 2002, which the trial court
granted. 2 1 During the exploration of the preserved electronic evidence,
Tekhead discovered the June 13 E-mail originated with Dospam and had
been routed through a third-party server in Korea. 22 Tekhead then filed
claims against Dospam alleging intrusion upon seclusion and publicly
placing him in a false light.
C.

DospAM's

BACKGROUND

Dospam is a resident and citizen of a neighboring state, the State of
Potter, but grew up in Johnstonville, a small town in downstate Marshall, where his parents still reside. 23 Dospam also submitted a resume
to Distress Technologies in June 1996, before accepting a position with a
24
software company in the State of Potter.
Since 2001, Dospam has operated http://www.webgags.com, a commercial online joke service, although Dospam claims the Web site has yet
to turn a profit. 25 The domain name is registered through an ICANNaccredited domain name registrar in the Cayman Islands, has contact
information located in the Cayman Islands, and uses a web hosting ser26
vice located in Monaco.
1.

Webgags' E-mails and Spiders

Unlike most online joke services that merely allow subscribers to receive digital humor via electronic mail, Webgags allows its customers, for
27
a fee, to play digital practical jokes on other, unsuspecting individuals.
Webgags offers a selection of practical joke computer programs that can
be sent to individuals via electronic mail, which include making a com19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See R. at 6.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. Dospam noted in his affidavit that he set the Web site up in this manner to
avoid nuisance lawsuits.
27. See id.
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puter screen appear as if files are being deleted, playing loud noises, and
playing distracting songs. 2s A customer chooses one of the programs
sent to a specific individual electronic mail address, which will be sent in
a targeted electronic mail message ("Target E-mail"). When the unsuspecting victim of a Webgags joke opens the Target E-mail, the chosen
program temporarily takes control of the target's computer acting as the
29
customer had directed.
In order to promote Webgags' Web site, Dospam employed "spiders,"
software programs that search the World Wide Web looking for electronic mail addresses published on Web sites. The spiders collect the
electronic mail addresses found. 30 Dospam compiles these addresses
and then sends unsolicited e-mail messages to the compiled addresses.
One of Dospam's spiders collected electronic mail addresses from the Distress' Web site from one page that lists all its employees, including
31
Tekhead, and their respective electronic mail addresses.
2.

The June 13, 2002 E-mail, and Tekhead's Address Book

Dospam's unsolicited e-mail messages contained the subject line
"Documents Relating to Upcoming Review." The message also included a
program attached to it that would (1) open an animated image file of two
cartoon characters dancing in the nude; (2) increase the target computer's speaker volume to the maximum level possible; (3) locate the user
name associated with the target computer from the individual settings
on the computer; (4) audibly announce "ALERT! STOP VIEWING
PORN! CLOSE YOUR BROWSER IMMEDIATELY!"; (5) repeat the
message; and (6) preclude any keyboard control of the computer. 32 At the
same time, the program locates and transmits the contents of the target
computer's Microsoft Outlook address book to Dospam. 3 3 This was the
programming contained in the June 13, 2002 E-mail message received
34
and opened by Tekhead.
Dospam published Tekhead's Outlook address book on Webgags.com
Web site after receiving service of process for Tekhead's suit against Dospam. 3 5 The web page upon which all the electronic mail addresses in the
Outlook address book appeared included a statement that read, "Mr.
Tekhead filed suit against me, obviously he can't take a joke. Here's his
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
R. at 7.
id.
id.
id.
id.
R. at 5, 7.
R. at 7.
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address book. Make him pay for his lack of humor."36 In addition to
work related electronic mail contacts, the Outlook address book also included the electronic mail addresses of several personal contacts, some of
whom began to receive spam after their e-mail addresses were published
37
on the Webgags Web site.
Tekhead filed a two-count lawsuit against Dospam based on the
above-listed events. The Farbrook County Circuit Court concluded that
jurisdiction existed over Dospam. However, the Circuit Court granted
Dospam's motion as to false light and intrusion upon seclusion. The First
Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court's decision. This appeal
followed.
III.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Three issues have been raised on appeal: (1) whether the Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the trial court has proper jurisdiction over
Dospam; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that no genuine issue of material fact existed to evidence a theory of false light invasion of privacy; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that no genuine issue of material fact existed to establish the requisite
elements to evidence of theory of intrusion upon seclusion.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

JURISDICTION

A court may exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant
where authorized to do so by a long-arm statute 38 based upon specific
jurisdiction arising from conduct connected to the suit, or by finding general jurisdiction supported by the defendant's persistent but unrelated
contacts with the forum state. 3 9 General jurisdiction must be based upon
"continuous and systematic" activities in the state,40 a standard that
clearly is not met in this case. To determine whether specific jurisdiction
exists, we apply the three-pronged test set forth in InternationalShoe
36. See R. at 7-8.
37. See R. at 8.
38. The reach of Marshall's long-arm statute is coextensive with that permitted by the
Due process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The relevant of the long-arm statute is
as follows:
A tribunal of the State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the
personal representative of a deceased individual who would be subject to jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a
cause of action or other matter arising from such person: (1) transacting any business in this State... Marshall Revised Code, 735 MRC 25-302.
39. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 293 F.3d 707, 715 (4th Cir. 2002).
40. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
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Co. v. Washington,4 1 : (1) the defendant must have sufficient "minimum
contacts" with the forum state ("purposeful availment of the privileges of
conducting activities within the forum state"); (2) the claim asserted
against the defendant must arise out of those contacts; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable (there must be a "substantial
42
enough connection" between the defendant and the forum state).
In regards to the Internet, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot
Com, Inc.43 utilized a sliding scale in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a defendant. Whether jurisdiction exists depends
upon the level of interactivity on the Web site, as well as the commercial
nature of the exchange of information on the Web site as predominant
factors. 44 This sliding scale grants personal jurisdiction to active Web
sites, which exchanges information with users, while passive Web sites,
which just places information on a web page for others to view at their
leisure, are not subject to personal jurisdiction.
As to the first element, a defendant purposefully avails himself
when the defendant's contacts with the forum state "proximately result
from actions by the defendant himself that create a 'substantial connection' with the forum state."4 5 These actions must be deliberate, and can
46
not be random, fortuitous or attenuated.
As to the second element, the claim asserted must arise out of the
defendant's forum related activities. If the defendant's contacts with the
forum state are related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an
47
action will be deemed to have arisen from those contacts.
The final element in the personal jurisdiction analysis states the defendant's actions with the forum state must be enough to make the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant constitutionally
reasonable. 48 To be reasonable, jurisdiction "must comport with 'fair
play and substantial justice."' 4 9 Once a court finds "the first two elements of a prima facie case-purposeful availment and a cause of action
arising from the defendant's contacts with the forum state-then an in41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. Intl. Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316; see also Young v. New HavenAdvoc., 315 F.3d 256,
261 (4th Cir. 2002), Verizon Online Serv. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611 (E.D. Va.
2002).
43. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
44. 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
45. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (citing McGee v. Intl. Life
Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223); see also CompuServe Inc. v.Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257,
1263 (6th Cir 1996).
46. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475.
47. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267 (citing Reynolds v. Intl. Amateur Athletic Fedn., 23
F.3d 1110, 1119 (6th Cir. 1994).
48. Verizon, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 621.
49. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476 (citing Intl. Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320).
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50
ference arises that this third factor is present."

1.

PotentialArguments

In this case, Tekhead may argue that Dospam purposefully availed
himself of the privileges of doing business in Marshall by actively soliciting business through his practical joke e-mails. These e-mails were designed for the sole purpose of generating business at Dospam's Web site,
www.webgags.com. From these e-mails, Dospam reasonably should have
expected to be haled into court in Marshall for any injuries that would
51
result from his own actions.
Dospam may counter the purposeful availment element with two arguments. First, Dospam may state his actions are the result of random
actions brought about by the "spiders," for Dospam had no control over
what e-mail addresses the "spiders" brought back. Second, Dospam may
argue that his e-mails are analogous to the "stream of commerce"
cases, 52 since Dospam did not know exactly where his e-mails would
eventually go because his programs determined what e-mail addresses
would be retrieved for Dospam's e-mails.
Dospam may also contend that he has not made a profit from the
Web site at issue here, and therefore, no commercial activity has occurred. However, available case law goes against this premise. In Maritz
v.Cybergold,5 3 the defendant had put up a Web site as a promotion for
an upcoming Internet service, forwarded advertisements to users interested in the service, and encouraged users to add their e-mail addresses
to a mailing list to receive updates about the service. 5 4 Even though the
defendant had yet to engage in any sales, the court held that the e-mails
were active solicitations designed to promote business, and also rejected
55
the notion that the defendant operated a passive Web site.
Dospam's actions in the State of Marshall are related to the operative facts of the controversy. Dospam sent out an e-mail to Tekhead that
contained offensive material. Dospam's e-mail led to Tekhead's termination at Distress. Dospam's e-mail placed Tekhead in a false light at his
workplace, and his privacy was invaded through the acquisition of his
50. Verizon, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 621 (quoting CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268).
51. See generally Verizon, 203 F. Supp. at 616 (allowing personal jurisdiction against
out-of-state spammers).
52. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Supreme Court held that automobile passing through Oklahoma did not constitute minimum
contacts with Oklahoma so as to permit Oklahoma courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
over nonresident defendant auto-maker).
53. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
54. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1330.
55. Id. at 1335-36.
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Outlook address book. But for Dospam's transmission of the June 13,
2002 E-mail, Tekhead would not have received an injury.
In determining whether Dospam's contacts with the State of Marshall are substantial enough to make jurisdiction reasonable, a court is
likely to consider that the burdens on Dospam in this case are relatively
low, and that Tekhead's interests in obtaining convenient and effective
judgment in Marshall are high. 5 6 Dospam lived in Marshall, attended
school in Marshall, and lives in Potter, an adjacent state. Meanwhile,
Tekhead suffered the incidents while working and living in Marshall,
and is currently engaged in another suit with Distress for the same incident. The most efficient resolution of these controversies and the shared
interests of the States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies indicate that jurisdiction is proper in Marshall. Also, Dospam placed
his Web site's contacts in foreign jurisdictions (Monaco and the Cayman
Islands) as a way to avoid lawsuits, possibly indicating a desire on Dospam's part to avoid otherwise actionable activities.
Dospam may counter this by arguing that since he is focusing on
sales throughout the United States, and not necessarily focusing upon
57
and targeting Marshall, he is not subject to Marshall's jurisdiction.
Dospam offers a service that is available to any customer in the entire
United States, and the world, and cannot be held liable to any and all
jurisdictions.
Finally, Dospam may also argue that jurisdiction does not exist over
him in placing Tekhead's Outlook address book on his Web site. This is
because the placement of the address book was on a passive web page,
did not promote any commercial interest and was not directed at any
particular state. Courts have held that passive information on a Web site
that has commercial interactivity is not subject to personal jurisdiction. 58 The presence of Internet banner advertisements on the Web site
does not alter this analysis. 5 9 As long as the site is passive, specific per60
sonal jurisdiction does not exist.
B.

FALSE LIGHT

To be liable for false light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show
(1) that the defendant placed the plaintiff in a false light before the public; (2) that the false light would be highly offensive to a reasonable per56. See Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700-701 (D. Md.
2001) (citing Pitt. Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 831 F.2d 522, 529 (4th Cir.
1987)).
57. Am. Info. Corp., 139 F. Supp. at 700 (citing ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126
F.3d 617, 625 (4th Cir. 1997)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at n. 8.
60. See generally Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119.
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son; and, (3) the defendant acted with knowledge of or reckless disregard
61
for the falsity of the statements at issue.
Some courts have noted that the heart of this tort lies in the publicity.62 As to the first element, a matter is made public by communicating
it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. 6 3
Despite the heart of this tort being the matter of publicity, the Restatement does not contain a substantial definition of "publicity" for use in a
false light claim. 64 As a result, many courts have adopted the definition
of "publicity" contained in § 652(d), Comment (a) of the Restatement of
Torts. 6 5 Under § 652(d), Comment (a), publicity is defined as ". . . the
matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to so
many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain
to become one of public knowledge." 66 However, some courts have also
held that the publication requirement is met when the publicity is made
to a group of persons with which the plaintiff has a special
67
relationship.
As to the second element, the highly offensive standard requires
proof that a reasonable person would be seriously offended by the publication. 68 While interpreting this section, courts have generally held that
something is highly offensive if it would cause emotional distress or embarrassment to a reasonable person.
In applying the reasonable person standard, courts have held that
acts that would offend a hypersensitive person are not actionable. 69
Courts have also held that the highly offensive standard must be narrowly construed with any applicable First Amendment rights of free
70
speech.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(E); see also Forbose v.Am. Say. and Loan
Assn. of Danville, 152 F.3d 602, 617 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Kolegas v. Heftel Broad. Corp.
607 N.E.2d 201, 209-10 (Ill. 1992)).
62. Forbose, 152 F.3d at 617 (citing Lovgren v. Citizens First Natl. Bank of Princeton,
534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. 1989)).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(E), CMT. (A).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(E), Comment (a) indicates only that Restatement § 652(c), Comment (a) is applicable as what constitutes publicity and the publicity of application of a simple disclosure. However, this comment states that "[t]he interest
protected by the rule. . . is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own
identity... in so far as the use may be of benefit to him or others." § 652(c) concerns appropriation of a name or likeness.
65. Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1987).
66. § 652(d) concerns publicity given to private life.
67. Miller v.Motorola, 560 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1990).

68.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§

6

52(E),

cmt.

c.

69. Lougren, 534 N.E.2d at 990.
70. See Faloona v. Hustler Magazine, 799 F.2d 1000, 1007 (5th Cir. 1986) (Non-offensive photographs in "manifestly offensive" magazine not actionable as false light claim).
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As to the third element of the false light test, a plaintiff must prove
the actor had knowledge of or acted with reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other was
placed. 7 1 In evaluating such a standard, courts have held that there
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication, and
that publishing with such doubts shows reckless disregard for the truth
or falsity of the statement and constitutes actual malice. 72 The United
States Supreme Court has explained the actual malice standard as:
[T]he actual malice standard is not satisfied merely through a showing
of ill will or 'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term... Nor can the fact
that the defendant published the defamatory material in order to increase its profits suffice to prove actual malice ....Actual malice, instead, requires at a minimum that the statements were made with a
reckless disregard for the truth. And although the concept of 'reckless
disregard' 'cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition,' we
have made clear that the defendant must have made the false publication with a 'high degree of awareness of.. probable falsity,' or must
73
have 'entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.'
1.

PotentialArguments

In arguing that Dospam is liable for false light, Tekhead will probably state that some courts have adopted a looser definition of "publicity"
in false light cases where there is a special relationship between the
plaintiff and the "particular public."74 Here, Tekhead will assert he had
a special relationship with those few people who viewed Dospam's email: they were Tekhead's co-workers, and had been for two years.
Tekhead would argue that as a result of such a long time in a co-worker
relationship, the viewers of Dospam's e-mail were in a close and special
relationship with Tekhead, and therefore would qualify for the purposes
of publicity.
Dospam may counter Tekhead's argument by stating the publicity
requirement is not met because this e-mail was not viewed by the general public. Dospam may also state that Tekhead's co-workers do not
qualify as a "special relationship" for they are not close relatives or close
friends. While Tekhead does work with these people, there is no evidence
that Tekhead shares any particular close bond with anybody at Distress.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(E).

72. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
73. Solano v. Playgirl, 292 F.3d 1078, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Harte-Hanks
Commun., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1989)).
74. Miller v. Motorola, 560 N.E.2d at 903; see also Dietz v. Finlay Fine Jewelry, 754
N.E.2d 958, 966 (Ind.App. 2001) (citing Doe v.Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 692 (Ind.
1997)).
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Dospam may also argue that Tekhead's own past interactions among his
co-workers at Distress may have caused Tekhead to be a bit of a pariah.
Because Tekhead has not established that a special relationship exists
with his co-workers, the proper standard to use is the widespread publicity standard, which is not met by the few people at Distress who saw the
practical joke.
Tekhead will argue that the e-mail was highly offensive to a reasonable person. Dospam's e-mail made it seem like Tekhead was viewing
pornography while at work and set off an alarm while doing so. Dospam's
e-mail also made it seem like Tekhead was reverting back to his previous
ways where he was seen as a bit of slacker by his supervisors, except now
there was also an added element of deviance on Tekhead's part. Tekhead
would argue that this image which Dospam's e-mail has given to
Tekhead is clearly within the realm of highly offensive to a reasonable
person.
Meanwhile, Dospam will argue that the e-mail is not offensive for a
few reasons. First, the e-mail clearly states that this is a practical joke;
the e-mail contains a message giving the source of the e-mail as a practical joke service, and e-mails like this can be sent to others. This makes it
clear that Tekhead was not viewing pornography, even though the audio
message stated otherwise. Second, Dospam may argue that the e-mail is
not pornography, for it does not meet the standards of pornography and
obscenity. 75 The image Dospam created and that appeared on Tekhead's
computer was that of two cartoon characters dancing nude. No sexual
acts of any sort were displayed in this e-mail. Dospam may argue that
this e-mail did not appeal to a prurient interest, and, as such, is not offensive as obscenity or pornography. Dospam may also argue that
Tekhead is a hypersensitive plaintiff, and, under Lovgren, Dospam's email should not be seen as liable for false light.
Finally, Tekhead will state that Dospam acted with reckless disregard. Dospam created an e-mail practical joke making the recipient of
the joke to appear as if they had just been "outed" for viewing pornography. Dospam made no effort to see if any recipient of this e-mail actually
had been or ever was viewing pornography. Dospam made this e-mail as
a way to benefit commercially by promoting his practical joke Web site,
and did not care about any consequences of his e-mails. Tekhead may
also use the premise stated by the United States Supreme Court in Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., which states that individual states can decide to
75. See generally Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15 (1973). Gives test for obscenity as (a)
whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at 39.
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use a negligence standard for the actual malice requirement in cases
where the plaintiff is a private citizen. 7 6 In stating this case, Tekhead
may also argue for a lower standard to be applied here, much like in the
publicity requirement.
Dospam may argue that the false light test does not apply in this
case, for the e-mail was not made about Tekhead. There were no statements of or concerning Tekhead in Dospam's e-mail. The e-mail instead
stated this was a practical joke, and made no mention of Tekhead in any
way. The audio message did not mention Tekhead by name, and instead
gave a generic message without any names. However, Tekhead may
counter this by stating that the context of the e-mail on his computer,
with the audio message blaring out so that many people at his workplace
could hear constitutes that the joke would qualify as being of and concerning Tekhead.
C.

INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION

To be liable for intrusion upon seclusion, a plaintiff must show: (1)
an unauthorized intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion; (2) the
intrusion must be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3)
the matter on which the intrusion occurs must be private; and (4) the
intrusion causes anguish and suffering. 7 7 The Restatement also states
that the intrusion upon seclusion does not need to be of the physical variety, and can also be sensory, just as long as an individual's private concerns have been impinged upon. 78 Finally, courts have held that a
plaintiff must show that ". . .the defendant penetrated some zone of..
privacy surrounding, or obtained unwanted access or data about, the
79
plaintiff."
1.

PotentialArguments

Tekhead may argue that Dospam is liable for intrusion upon seclusion for two separate acts: (1) having an e-mail joke take over control of
Tekhead's computer, and (2) creating an e-mail program that sent
Tekhead's Outlook Address book to Tekhead.
First, in taking over Tekhead's computer, Dospam intruded into
Tekhead's seclusion. Dospam created a program that took over all functions of Tekhead's computer, and alerted everyone in the general vicinity
of Tekhead that he was viewing pornography, causing others to huddle
around Tekhead's computer. Dospam violated Tekhead's privacy by ob76.
77.
78.
79.

418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
Id.
Shulman v. Group W. Prod., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998).
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taining unwarranted access to Tekhead's information through temporarily taking over Tekhead's computer.
Second, and the stronger argument of the two, Tekhead may argue
that by acquiring Tekhead's Outlook Address book, Dospam is now liable
for intrusion upon seclusion. Here, it is important to note that in determining the degree on intrusion, the court needs to evaluate the context,
conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion, including the intruder's motive, the setting, and the privacy expectation of the person
whose privacy was invaded. 8 0 Here, Dospam acquired Tekhead's E-mail
address book, primarily for the purpose of using it to send out more spam
e-mails promoting his Web site. Also, Dospam later published Tekhead's
E-mail address book online, and advocated others to send spam e-mails
and/or hate e-mails to Tekhead and Tekhead's friends. Tekhead would
argue that Dospam's actions in acquiring the address book are clearly
outrageous, involve a private matter, and have caused anguish and suffering as a result.
Dospam's counter argument may rest upon an important premise,
that being Tekhead has no privacy interest to protect in this matter.
Tekhead's employer, Distress Technologies, implemented an Electronic
Information Systems Policy which clearly states that employees do not
have a privacy interest while using Distress' electronic information sys81
tems, e-mails and all data created or stored on Distress' computers.
Such policies have been upheld by courts, and these types of policies
have been outlined by courts as ways to diminish an employee's expectations of privacy in the workplace.8 2 Because Tekhead has no real expectation of privacy at Distress, there has been no intrusion upon seclusion
here. While the intrusion may be considered outrageous, there is nothing
private in the matter; Tekhead's address book was stored on a system
that Tekhead knew, or had reason to know, would be monitored on a
regular basis. Tekhead also knew, or had reason to know, that he had no
expectation of privacy while at Distress due to the explicit provision in
Distress' Electronic Information Systems Policy. Here, there is nothing
private that has been infringed upon as a result of Dospam's actions.
80. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1282
(Nev. 1995) (citing Miller v. Natl. Broad.Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (App. 2d Dist. 1986)).
81. See Exhibit A (Electronic Information Systems Policy), 3.
82. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Super. Ct. ofL.A. County, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 162 (App.
2d Dist. 2002).
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ine issues of material fact as to Tekhead's claims of being placed in a
false light and intrusion upon seclusion. The Opinion and Order of the
First District Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall, affirming the
Circuit Court's opinion on all claims is also unreported and contained in
the Record on Appeal at 1 - 11.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A formal statement of jurisdiction is omitted pursuant to §1020(2) of
the Rules for the Twenty-Second Annual John Marshall Law School
Moot Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy Law.
STATUTORY AND RESTATEMENT PROVISIONS
The text of various provisions of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
which are relevant to the determination of this case, are set forth
in Appendix A.
TORTS,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

This suit arises from invasion of privacy claims brought by PlaintiffAppellant, Alexander Tekhead (hereinafter "Tekhead") against Defendant-Appellee Allan Dospam (hereinafter "Dospam") as a result of a
June 13, 2002 e-mail sent to Tekhead from Dospam and Dospam's subsequent actions.
Since June 20, 2000, Tekhead was a permanent employee with Distress Technologies, Inc. (hereinafter "Distress"), a software manufacturer located in Digital, Marshall. (R. at 2 - 4.) Like all new hires,
Tekhead received a copy of Distress' Employee Handbook which contains
an Electronic Information Systems Policy (hereinafter the "Policy"). (R.
at 3, Exhibit A.) The Policy sets forth guidelines for employee computer
use and states that misuse of Distress' information systems may result
in disciplinary action, including termination. (Exhibit A.)
Despite exhibiting motivational problems early in his career,
Tekhead became an exemplary employee who was recommended by his
supervisor for "Employee of the Month." (R. at 4.) In his final performance review, Tekhead was described as "professional" and "a great team
player." (Exhibit B.) He displayed a professional attitude, worked efficiently and was recommended for "a new position with more responsibility." (Exhibit C.)
On June 13, 2002, one week prior to his final performance review,
Tekhead was working diligently when he received an e-mail entitled
"Documents for Review" that appeared to originate from a senior manager at Distress. (R. at 4.) Upon opening the e-mail, an image of nude
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figures appeared on his screen and his computer warned "ALERT! STOP
VIEWING PORN! CLOSE YOUR BROWSER IMMEDIATELY!" which
was broadcast at maximum volume. (R. at 5.) The e-mail also included a
hyperlink directing Tekhead to the Web site "webgags.com" (hereinafter
"Webgags"). (R. at 7.) Hurriedly, Tekhead tried to close the e-mail as
laughing co-workers began crowding around his computer to view the
image. (R. at 5.) As the audible message kept repeating itself, a flustered Tekhead was met by his supervisor, who also attempted to shut
down the garish display that was quickly causing a scene. (R. at 5.)
Tekhead's supervisor's efforts also failed as the keyboard appeared to offer no remedy for the situation. (R. at 5.) In a last ditch effort to stop the
calamity, Tekhead's supervisor yanked the computer cord from the outlet, causing the system to shut down immediately. (R. at 5.)
Angered over the disturbance, Tekhead's supervisor ordered him to
leave for the day. (R. at 5.) The following afternoon, Distress' general
counsel telephoned Tekhead and informed him that he had been terminated for willful violation of the Employee Handbook. (R. at 5.) Tekhead
then filed suit against Distress for wrongful termination. (R. at 5.) It is
widely known within Distress that there are strict company policies regarding Internet and e-mail use. (R. at 3, Exhibit A.) Employees may
not send or receive personal e-mail, or otherwise use their computer in a
loud or distracting manner. Tekhead understood and followed these
policies.
Discovery for his wrongful termination action revealed that the offensive e-mail originated with Allan Dospam, a resident of the neighboring state of Potter and also the creator and operator of Webgags. (R. at 5
- 6.) Webgags is registered in the Cayman Islands and is hosted by a
service in Monaco, which also provides e-mail service. (R. at 6.) Webgags is operated in this manner in order to avoid lawsuits. (R. at 6.)
Webgags provides subscribers with interactive humor through digital practical jokes that can be played on any unsuspecting person. (R. at
6.) The pranks include making a computer screen appear as if files are
being deleted, playing loud noises, and playing distracting songs. (R. at
6.) To promote his Web site, Dospam utilizes "spiders" that search the
World Wide Web looking for e-mail addresses located on Web sites. (R.
at 7.) Dospam then targets these individuals and sends them unsolicited
e-mails, often in the form of a "webgag." (R. at 7.) This is the type of email that was targeted at Tekhead.
The promotional webgags include computer program that displays a
nude image, increases the computer's speaker volume to its maximum,
audibly warns the user to stop looking at pornography, and precludes
any keyboard control. (R. at 8.) The program accesses and steals the
contents of each recipient's e-mail address book, which are transmitted
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to Dospam to generate new, unsuspecting individuals for the promotional campaign. (R. at 7.)
After Tekhead filed suit against Dospam for intrusion upon seclusion and publicly placing him in a false light, Dospam published the entire contents of Tekhead's address book on the webgags site. (R. at 7.)
Dospam also posted a statement admonishing Tekhead for his lack of
humor and encouraging viewers to "make him pay." (R. at 7 - 8.) Since
the posting Tekhead has received numerous complaints from family and
friends regarding a deluge of harassing "spam." (R. at 8.)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Tekhead filed suit against Dospam in the Farbrook County Circuit
Court alleging tortious intrusion upon seclusion and publicity placing
him in a false light. Dospam filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to
both claims. (R. at 1.) Dospam also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment alleging that the State of Marshall did not have personal jurisdiction over him. (R. .at 1.)
The trial court denied Dospam's motion regarding personal jurisdiction and went on to consider his motion for summary judgment on the
substantive claims. (R. at 1.) The court granted Dospam's Motion for
Summary Judgment on the intrusion and false light claims. (R. at 1.)
Tekhead appealed the judgment on the substantive claims and Dospam
cross-appealed on the issue of personal jurisdiction. (R. at 1.)
The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court on both the jurisdiction and substantive issues. (R. at 2.) Finding
that there were no genuine issues of material fact the District Court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision that Dospam was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both the intrusion and false light claims. (R.
at 1 - 2.) This Court has granted Tekhead and Dospam leave to appeal
to determine whether the First District Court of Appeals erroneously affirmed the decision of the Farbrook Circuit Court. (R. at 12.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

JURISDICTION

The lower courts correctly denied Dospam's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the issue of personal jurisdiction because the record fails to
demonstrate that Marshall's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dospam is not authorized under Marshall's long-arm statute or that it does
not comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process. Marshall's longarm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause regarding nonresident defendants transacting business in this state, and Dospam's operation and promotion of Webgags is a "business" activity. The normal
two-step jurisdictional inquiry therefore collapses into a single inquiry as
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to whether Marshall's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dospam comports with Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Marshall's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dospam comports
with Fourteenth Amendment due process because Dospam purposefully
availed himself of Marshall, because Tekhead's invasion of privacy
claims arose out of Dospam's contacts with Marshall, and because Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. Dospam purposefully
availed himself of Marshall by purposefully directing his operation and
promotion of Webgags toward Marshall. Further, Dospam's conduct
caused harm, the brunt of which was suffered and which Dospam knew
was likely to be suffered in Marshall. Tekhead's invasion of privacy
claims arose out of Dospam's contacts with Marshall because Tekhead
would not have been publicly been placed in a false light, nor would he
have experienced any unauthorized intrusion upon his seclusion if not
for Dospam's operation and promotion of Webgags. Moreover, Tekhead's
claims bear a substantial connection to Dospam's operation and promotion of Webgags. Finally, Dospam failed demonstrate that Marhsall's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
This Court should affirm the lower court's denial of Dospam's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of personal jurisdiction because
Dospam purposefully availed himself of Marshall, Tekhead's claims
arose out of Dospam's contacts with Marshall, and Marshall's exercise of
jurisdiction over Dospam comports with the Due Process Clause.
II.

INVASION OF PRIVACY

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision to grant Dospam's Motion for Summary Judgment on Tekhead's claim of intrusion
upon seclusion and false light invasion of privacy. Genuine issues of material fact as to Tekhead's intrusion claim abound. Tekhead's use of a
password protected e-mail account and his reliance upon Distress' Computer Policy, which implies a privacy expectation against third-parties,
manifested a subjective expectation that the e-mail address book was
private. Tekhead's expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable because e-mail is regarded as private and because it is analogous to telephone conversations and the U.S. Mail. Moreover, Distress's Computer
Policy clearly contemplates an employee's expectation that e-mail accounts are private. Dospam's access and use of Tekhead's e-mail address
book was a tortious intrusion upon Tekhead's right to seclusion because
Dospam's conduct is legally recognized as an intrusion and because it
was not authorized.
The Court of Appeals similarly erred in upholding the finding that
there were no genuine issues of material fact as to Dospam's portrayal of
Tekhead in a false light before the public. To sustain a false light claim,
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fictitious circumstances must be represented to the public as being true.
Dospam's e-mail made Tekhead appear to be viewing pornography on his
office computer, when this is something he does not do. Even when it
became clear that Tekhead was not viewing pornography, Tekhead was
still depicted as engaging in disruptive and inefficient conduct, which is
proscribed by Distress' Computer Policy. Both of these false depictions
were reasonably understood by his employer to be the truth.
The publicity element of Tekhead's false light claim is established
because a disclosure was made to a particular public with which
Tekhead had a special relationship. Co-workers are considered to have a
special relationship with one another because their knowledge of private
facts may cause embarrassment and damage resulting from the dynamic
and hierarchy of the workplace. The false portrayal of Tekhead as an
inefficient and unprofessional employee caused him severe embarrassment and lasting damage, specifically the termination of his employment
as a result of the incident. The number of individuals who witnessed the
incident is irrelevant as their special relationship is dispositive of the
publicity issue.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT PERSONAL
JURISDICTION OVER DOSPAM WAS PROPER BECAUSE THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION COMPORTS WITH MARSHALL'S LONG ARM STATUTE AND STANDARDS OF DUE
PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
This Court should affirm the denial of Dospam's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of personal jurisdiction because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Marshall may properly assert
personal jurisdiction over Dospam. Dospam's Motion for Summary
Judgment must be denied unless the record demonstrates the absence of
any genuine issue of material fact as to whether Marshall may assert
personal jurisdiction over Dospam and that Dospam is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MARSHALL R. Civ. P. 56(C). Courts apply a twostep analysis for determining whether a state may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. First, jurisdiction must
be authorized by the forum State's long-arm statute. Second, jurisdiction must be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. To prove that no genuine issues of material facts exist as to
whether Marshall may assert jurisdiction over him, Dospam must
demonstrate either that Marshall's exercise of personal jurisdiction is
not authorized under Marshall's long-arm statute, or that it does not
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comport with standards of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Dospam fails in both cases.
A.

THE STATE OF MARSHALL PROPERLY ASSERTED PERSONAL

JURISDICTION OVER DosPAM UNDER ITS LONG-ARM STATUTES BECAUSE

TEKHEAD'S CLAIMS AROSE OUT OF DospAM's BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
IN MARSHALL

Dospam failed to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction is not authorized under Marshall's long-arm statute. Marshall's long-arm statute
provides, in pertinent part, that a State court "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person ...as to a cause of action or other matter arising
from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this State. ..." MAR_
SHALL REVISED CODE, 735 MRC-302. Marshall courts have recognized
that this provision renders the reach of the long-arm statute coextensive
with that permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment regarding nonresident defendants transacting business in
this State. (R. at 8.)
Although Marshall's long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due
Process Clause with respect to nonresident defendants transacting business in this state, issues of fact remain as to whether Dospam's operation
and promotion of Webgags through targeted, unsolicited e-mails can be
considered a "business" activity. As Marshall precedent is lacking as to
the definition of "business" and other state and federal jurisdictions have
focused on the issue of what it means to be "transacting business" with a
particular forum State, rather than on "what is business," it is proper to
rely on the plain meaning of the word "business." Business is defined as
"a usually commercial or mercantile activity engaged in as a means of
livelihood." See, Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, available at http://
www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary (accessed Aug. 29, 2003). A "commercial activity" is one that is viewed with regard to profit, designed for a
large market, and/or supported by advertisers. Id. Although Dospam
claims that Webgags has yet to turn a profit, he concedes that Webgags
is operated as a commercial service and that the web site contains paid
advertisements. (R. at 6.) Further, as a Web site posted on the World
Wide Web, Webgags is clearly designed to reach a large market. It is
unmistakable that Dospam's operation of Webgags constitutes a "business" activity. As the reach of Marshall's long-arm statute is coextensive
with that permitted by the Due Process Clause regarding nonresident
defendants transacting business in Marshall, the normal two-step jurisdictional inquiry collapses into a single-step due process inquiry. Consequently, the remaining elements of the long-arm statute, namely,
whether the nature and extent of Dospam's business activity can be considered "transacting any business" in Marshall and whether Tekhead's
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claims "arose out of' Dospam's transacting any business in Marshall so
as to render him amenable to suit here, will be addressed under the rubric of a Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis.
B.

SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER

STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS BECAUSE

DosPAM

DosPAM

COMPORTS WITH

PURPOSEFULLY AVAILED

HIMSELF OF MARSHALL, TEKHEAD'S CLAIM AROSE OUT OF DospAM's
CONTACTS WITH MARSHALL, AND JURISDICTION

Is

REASONABLE

Marshall may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Dospam
because the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with the Due Process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dospam's purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of transacting business in Marshall
through his operation of Webgags and his sending of promotional e-mail
to Marshall residents. Dospam's forum-related conduct gave rise to
Tekhead's invasion of privacy claims, and Dospam failed to prove that
Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Marshall's exercise of personal jurisdiction is therefore proper.
Marshall courts may assert personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants transacting business in this State to the extent such jurisdiction comports with Fourteenth Amendment due process. Jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant comports with constitutional due process
when a defendant has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum State]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."' Intl. Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) (quoting, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
The Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make
binding a judgment in personam against an individual . . .with which
the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." Intl. Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
The application of the minimum contacts rule will vary based on the
quality and nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum State, "but
it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[tihe unilateral activity of those
who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy
the requirements of contact with the forum State." Id.; see also
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417
(1984).
For a state to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, due
process requires something more than the defendant's awareness of his
product's entry into the forum State through the stream of commerce.
The act of placing a good into the stream of commerce does not become
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"purposeful availment" simply because the defendant is conscious that
the good may eventually end up in the forum State. Asahi Metal Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). Rather, the
"'substantial' connection between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action
of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id.
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
Courts in other jurisdictions have compared creating a Web site to placing a good into the stream of commerce, noting that merely creating and
posting a Web site, without something more, is not an act purposefully
directed toward the forum state. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v.King,
937 F. Supp. 295, 301 (1996). The foreseeablity that the defendant's
product may end up in the forum (and by analogy that the defendant's
Web site may be viewed in the forum) alone is not sufficient to assert
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980). Rather, "the foreseeability
that is critical to due process is. . . the likelihood.., that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at 297.
Courts in Marshall and other jurisdictions apply a three-prong test
to determine whether specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
is proper. See e.g. PanavisionInt'l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320
(9th Cir. 1998); Zippo Mfg Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1122-23 (W.D. Pa. 1997). First, the defendant must have purposefully
availed himself of forum State benefits. That is, the nonresident defendant must have had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum State to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction. Second, the claim asserted against
the defendant must arise out of the defendant's forum-related contacts or
activities. 1 Third, the exercise of jurisdiction by the forum State must
comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice. That is, the
assertion of jurisdiction must be reasonable. This Court should affirm
the lower courts' denial of Dospam's Motion for Summary Judgment on
the issue of personal jurisdiction because Dospam's operation and promotion of Webgags satisfies all three prongs of this test.

1. Courts recognize both general personal jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. A state is said to assert "general" jurisdiction over the defendant when it exercises
jurisdiction over a defendant on all clams against the defendant, whether or not such
claims are related to the defendant's forum-related conduct. A state is said to assert "specific" jurisdiction when it exercises jurisdiction over a defendant only as regards claims
"arising from" or "related to" the defendant's forum-related conduct. See Arthur T. von
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv.
L Rev. 1121, 1136-1163 (1966).
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Dospam purposefully availed himself of the privilege of transacting
business in Marshall by operating and promoting "Webgags"

The "constitutional touchstone" regarding the exercise of personal
jurisdiction "remains whether the defendant purposefully established
'minimum contacts' in the forum State." Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at
474. The purposeful availment prong "ensures that a defendant will not
be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or
'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another party or a
third person." Id. at 475. (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc. 465 U.S.
770, 774 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 299; Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. at 417). This requirement is satisfied
when "the defendant purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities
toward the forum so that he should expect, by virtue of the benefit he
receives, to be subject to the court's jurisdiction" based on such activities.
U.S. v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 624 (1st Cir. 2001).
Through his operation and promotion of Webgags, Dospam purposefully availed himself of Marshall by purposefully directing his activities
toward Marshall and toward Tekhead, a Marshall resident. In collecting
Tekhead's e-mail address, Dospam accessed Distress' Web site, hosted on
a server located in Marshall, through the use of "spider" software programs. (R. at 7.) Further, he sent the e-mail message that resulted in
Tekhead's discharge directly to Tekhead at Tekhead's place of employment in Marshall. (R. at 4-5.) Dospam also utilized Distress' company
computer server, located in Marshall, to deliver his targeted e-mail message straight to Tekhead's computer, also located in Marshall. (R. at 2,
4-5.) Dospam's e-mail temporarily "took over" Tekhead's computer. (R.
at 7.) Moreover, a program attached to Dospam's e-mail infiltrated
Tekhead's computer, located Tekhead's Microsoft Outlook address book
and transmitted if from Marshall to the state of Potter. (R. at 7.) Finally, Dospam's e-mail solicited further contacts with Tekhead by displaying a hyperlink advertising the Webgags Web site and inviting
Tekhead to "do business" with Dospam by visiting Webgags, a commercial Web site that generates revenue through paid advertisements. (R.
at 7.) Based on these contacts, which were not random or fortuitous but
were targeted and deliberate, Dospam purposefully availed himself of
Marshall and thus knew or should have known that he would be subject
to suit there.
a)

Dospam's conduct satisfies the purposeful availment requirement
under the Zippo test

While it is exceedingly clear that Dospam satisfied the purposeful
availment requirement by directing his activities, that is, the operation
and promotion of Webgags, toward Marshall, he also satisfied the pur-
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poseful availment prong under the Zippo test.2 The premise of the Zippo
test is that "the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that the entity conducts over the Internet." Zippo Mfg
Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1124. Zippo envisions a "sliding scale" approach to
Internet contacts:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly
does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts
with residents in a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site that is
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does
little more than make information available to those who are interested
in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle
ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site.
Id. (citations omitted).
Dospam's operation and promotion of Webgags satisfies the Zippo
test because Dospam clearly does business over the Internet. Webgags'
business paradigm is to provide a free service ("digital practical jokes"),
and then to generate revenue by advertising to those "customers" who
either partake of Webgags' service or visit the Web site. Dospam's June
13, 2003 e-mail to Tekhead was effectively a "free sample" of his service
as well as a solicitation to Tekhead to visit Webgags to do business. Because Dospam was doing business over the Internet with a Marshall resident, Marshall's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Dospam is
proper.
Even if Dospam was not "doing business over the Internet" as contemplated by Zippo, Webgags occupies at least the middle ground of the
Zippo spectrum. That is, Dospam clearly operates an interactive Web
site. Webgags allows users to send computer "gags" to other individuals
via e-mail. (R. at 6.) Users must exchange information with Webgags'
host computer, including the address of the recipient and the type of gag
2. According to Amanda Reid, federal courts of appeal have employed two primary
tests for assessing personal jurisdiction in Internet-related cases, the Zippo test and the
Calder effects test. Reid notes that out of fourteen cases between 1996 and 2002 involving
personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts, eight explicitly or implicitly used one of
these two tests. The Fifth Circuit has expressly adopted the Zippo sliding scale test, while
the Ninth Circuit has consistently applied the effects test. Amanda Reid, Operationalizing
the Law of Jurisdiction:Where in the World Can I Be Sued for Operatinga World Wide Web
Page?, 8 Commun. L. & Pol'y 227, 240-41 (Spring 2003).
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requested. (R. at 6.) Webgags also reaches out to potential customers by
sending unsolicited targeted e-mails which direct the recipients to the
Web site. (R. at 7.) "Traditionally when an entity intentionally reaches
beyond its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper." Zippo Mfg Co., 952 F. Supp. at
1124, citing Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475. Finally, Dospam admits
that Webgags is a commercial venture and that Dospam is in business to
make money. (R. at 6.) As Dospam operates a Web site that conducts
business with Marshall residents, or at least is sufficiently interactive
with forum residents and is commercial in nature, Dospam's Internet activity constitutes purposeful availment under the Zippo test.
Decisions in which courts have failed to find purposeful availment
involve fact patterns that are very different from the instant case. In
Cybersell v. Cybersell, 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth
Circuit cited the Zippo test in holding that the defendant corporation,
which offered Web page construction services over the Internet, did not
purposefully avail itself of the forum state and thus was not subject to
personal jurisdiction for the purpose of a trademark infringement action.
In that case, the defendant conducted no commercial activity in the forum State, but merely posted a passive Web site using the name Cybersell, which the plaintiff was in process of registering as a federal
trademark. Id. at 415, 419. Noting that the defendant had no sales in
the forum and did nothing to encourage people in the forum to access its
Web site, the court held that, without something more, a passive Internet advertisement alone is not sufficient to demonstrate purposeful
availment. Id. at 419-20. See also S. Morantz, Inc. v. Hang & Shine
Ultrasonics, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541-42 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding
that mere maintenance of Internet Web site does not create personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant consistent with due process
where the plaintiff did not produce any evidence that the defendant actively sought out business in the forum through its Web site or any other
means or that the Web site gave rise to significant levels of contact with
forum users). In contrast, in the case at hand Dospam operated an interactive commercial Web site and directed an unsolicited promotional email to Tekhead at his workplace in Marshall. This targeted e-mail contained a hyperlink inviting Tekhead to visit Dospam's Webgags Web site.
The instant case is more similar to Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.,
947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996), where the defendant posted a Web
site promoting its upcoming Internet service. The promotions consisted
of assigning personal e-mail boxes to users and then forwarding advertisements to those users that matched their interests. Id. at 1330.
CyberGold planned to generate revenue by charging advertisers for the
right to send advertisements to its users. Id. The issue was whether
maintaining a Web site, which appeared to be maintained for the pur-
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pose of and in anticipation of being accessed by all Internet users, including forum residents, amounted to active solicitation so as to demonstrate
purposeful availment. Id. at 1332-33. The federal district court held
that it did. Id. at 1333. Although CyberGold's service was not yet operational, CyberGold encouraged Internet users to add their addresses to its
mailing list. Id. The court rejected CyberGold's contention that its Web
site was passive, noting that CyberGold's conduct amounted to active solicitation for the purpose of developing a mailing list and that the
CyberGold indiscriminately responded to every Internet user who accessed its site. Id. at 1333-34. See also Nicosia v. DeRooy, 72 F. Supp. 2d
1093, 1098-99 (N.D. Cal 1999) (noting that defendant's creation of a passive Web site by itself was not sufficient to subject her to jurisdiction in
the forum, but that defendant's directing of e-mails to addresses in the
forum inviting recipients to visit her Web site provided the "something
more" necessary to demonstrate purposeful availment). Like CyberGold,
Dospam sought to attract visitors to his Web site to generate advertising
revenue. Dospam went further than CyberGold however, by actively
targeting and soliciting customers, including Tekhead, a Marshall resident. As Dospam operated an interactive commercial Web site and actively solicited Marshall residents to visit his site, Dospam purposefully
availed himself of Marshall.
b) Dospam's conduct constitutes purposeful availment under the
Calder effects test
Even if this Court declines to adopt or apply the Zippo test, Dospam's tortious conduct satisfies the purposeful availment requirement
under the Calder effects test. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In
Calder, a reporter in Florida for the National Enquirer, a national magazine, wrote a story about actress Shirley Jones, who lived and worked in
California. Id. at 784-85. Jones sued the reporter and her editor for libel
in California. Id. at 784. The Supreme Court held that California could
assert jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants "based on the 'effects'
of their Florida conduct in California," observing that jurisdiction was
proper because the Florida defendants' intentional conduct in Florida
was calculated to cause injury in California. Id. at 789, 791. The court
noted that as the defendants knew that the brunt of the injury would be
felt by plaintiff in California, they must reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in that jurisdiction. Id. at 789-90.
Under the resulting Calder effects test, personal jurisdiction can be
based on (1) intentional actions, (2) expressly aimed at the forum State,
(3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the defendant
knows is likely to be suffered in the forum State. PanavisionInt'l., L.P.,
141 F.3d at 1321 (citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d
1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also Jewish Def Org. v. Super. Ct. of L.A.
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County, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1045, 1057 (1999). In the Seventh Circuit, the
state in which the injury occurred can always exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in the context of an intentional tort. See, Pavlovich v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 29 Cal. 4th 262, 270-72 (2002)
(citing, Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200 (7th Cir. 1997)). Other
Circuits require intentional conduct expressly aimed at or targeting the
forum State. Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 271.
Dospam's conduct satisfies the intent prong of the effects test. Dospam's sending of the June 13, 2002 e-mail that resulted in Tekhead's
discharge was clearly intentional. Sending unsolicited e-mail pranks
was a part of Dospam's strategy for promoting and drawing visitors to
the Webgags Web site so that Dospam could attract paid advertisers. (R.
at 7.) The specific contents of the e-mail were also intentional as the
subject line deceptively stated that the e-mail contained "Documents for
Review." (R. at 4.) In reality, the e-mail contained a program that took
control of Tekhead's computer and engaged in a series of well planned
and coordinated actions intended to shock, embarrass and frustrate the
recipient as well as pilfer e-mail addresses to target in the future. (R. at
5.) As both the sending and the content of the e-mail were intentional,
Dospam's conduct meets the first prong of the effects test.
Dospam's conduct also satisfies the requirement that the defendant's conduct be "expressly aimed" at the forum State. Dospam's conduct was in no way random. Rather, Dospam systemically targeted
Dospam and others to receive e-mail promotions. Dospam employed
software to trawl the World Wide Web searching for e-mail addresses.
(R. at 7.) Once he located such addresses, he "targeted' their owners
with unsolicited promotional e-mail messages. (R. at 7.) Dospam made
no attempt to avoid collecting e-mail addresses registered or hosted in
the State of Marshall. In fact, the Record refers to the recipients of his emails as "targets" and "target computers." (R. at 7.)
More importantly, Dospam expressly aimed his June 13, 2002 e-mail
at Tekhead, a forum resident. Dospam inserted Tekhead's e-mail address as the e-mail's destination knowing that it would be routed
through Distress' e-mail server, located in Marshall, and then onto
Tekhead's computer, also located in Marshall. That Dospam's e-mail
was aimed at Tekhead, or at least another employee of Distress, is confirmed by the fact that the e-mail identified a member of Distress' senior
management as its sender. (R. at 4.) Dospam knew that by identifying
the sender in such a way, Tekhead or another Distress employee would
likely open the e-mail. Even assuming, arguendo, that Dospam himself
did not "send the e-mail" because it originated at Webgags' e-mail server
in Monaco or that the e-mail was routed through a third-party server in
Korea, Dospam clearly caused the e-mail message to be delivered and
therefore remains responsible. Because Dospam's e-mail was expressly
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aimed at Tekhead, a Marshall resident, Dospam's conduct satisfies the
second prong of the effects test.
Finally, Dospam's conduct satisfies the "harm" prong of the effects
test. Dospam sent an e-mail message designed to shock and embarrass
Tekhead caused harm in Marshall, and Dospam knew or should have
known that this conduct was likely to have its planned effect. Dospam's
e-mail caused tremendous harm to Tekhead by intruding upon his seclusion and generating publicity placing Tekhead in a false light, which ultimately resulted in his discharge from Distress. Dospam also knew or
should have known that his conduct would cause harm in Marshall.
Dospam knew that his e-mail would cause a disturbance because the promotional e-mail was created specifically for that purpose. He also knew
that viewing and/or listening to obscene and/or offensive materials on
work computers would likely get an employee in trouble. In fact, Dospam admits that he registered and arranged to have Webgags hosted in
Grand Cayman and Monaco, respectively, to avoid lawsuits. (R. at 6.)
The fact that Dospam contemplated that he might get sued for his conduct strongly indicates that he knew or at least suspected that his Internet activities could cause harm and lead to litigation. Dospam sent an
e-mail message to Tekhead, a Marshall resident, at his place of employment in Marshall and caused harm in Marshall. Dospam knew or should
have know that such harm would occur. As Dospam's conduct satisfies
the third and final prong of the effects test Dospam purposefully availed
himself of Marshall.
In Jewish Defense Organization, the plaintiff brought a defamation
action against an organization and its founder based on statements
about the plaintiff posted on organization's New York-based Web site.
72 Cal. App. 4th at 1051-52. The court held that the effects test was not
satisfied where the plaintiff, who was not a forum resident and did not
prove that he had any clients in the forum or that the alleged defamatory
statements would impact a business interest or reputation in the forum,
failed to establish that it was foreseeable that a risk of injury would arise
in the forum state. Id. at 1059. Moreover, in Pavlovich v. Super. Ct. of
Santa Clara, defendant Pavlovich operated a passive Web site that
posted the source code of a program allowing users to decrypt data contained on DVDs. 29 Cal. 4th at 267. DVD CCA, a California resident,
sued Pavlovich, alleging that he misappropriated DVD CCA's trade
secrets by posting the decrypting program. Id. Pavlovich, a Texas resident, moved to quash service, arguing that California lacked jurisdiction
over his person. Id. The California Supreme Court observed that DVD
CCA's assertion that Pavlovich knew or should have known that his intentional acts would cause harm certain industries in the forum state
was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the effects test. Id. at
270-271. Rather, in order to satisfy the effects test, DVD CCA had to
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show that the Pavlovich expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum, which it failed to do. Id. at 273. The present case can be distinguished from both of the above cases because Dospam intentionally
directed his activities towards Marshall and knew or should have known
that his conduct would cause harm there.
The instant case is more similar to Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. v. Nissan
Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2000), where the plaintiff
sued for trademark infringement. Id. at 1157. The district court held
that the fact that the defendant derived advertising revenue by intentionally exploiting consumer confusion over its name supplied the "something more" necessary to demonstrate that that the defendant
deliberately directed its activity toward the forum state. Id. at 1160.
Further, the defendant should have known that the brunt of harm would
be suffered in the forum state because that was where the plaintiff is
based. Id. Similarly, Dospam should have known that the brunt of his
conduct would be felt in Marshall because he directed his June 13, 2002
e-mail at Tekhead, a Marshall resident, at Distress, a Marshall-based
company.
2.

Tekhead's false light and intrusion claims arose out of Dospam's
transactingbusiness in Marshall

The record clearly demonstrates that Tekhead's claims for invasion
of privacy arose out Dospam's operation and promotion of his Webgags
Web site. The Supreme Court of the United States observed in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia that when a claim arises out of a
defendant's contacts with the forum State, "a 'relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of
personal jurisdiction." 466 U.S. at 414 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). The law in Marshall is not well-settled as to the
appropriate test for determining whether a particular claim arose out of
a defendant's forum-related activities. Further, the Supreme Court of
the United States "has not provided precise criteria regarding the particular issue.. . [of] the necessary relationship between the plaintiffs cause
of action and the defendant's contacts in the forum." Vons Co., Inc. v.
Seabest Foods, Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 434, 453 (1996).
The trend in most jurisdictions is that specific personal jurisdiction
is appropriate so long as a claim bears a substantial connection to the
defendant's forum-related contacts. See id. at 452 ("[Als long as the
claim bears a substantial connection to the nonresident's forum contacts,
the exercise of specific jurisdiction is appropriate."); Third Nat. Bank in
Nashville v. Wedge Group Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that specific jurisdiction requires only "that the cause of action, of
whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant's in-
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state activities ... only when the operative facts of the controversy are
not related to the defendant's contact with the state can it be said that
the cause of action does not arise from that [contact]."); Akro Corp v.
Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the "arising out
of' standard is flexible and does require that the claim arise out of the
defendant's forum-related contacts in a strict sense); see also, In re Oil
Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983); Vermeulen v. Renault, USA, Inc., 985 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1992).
Federal Courts in other jurisdictions, including California, employ
an even less stringent "but for" standard for determining whether the
"arising out of" requirement is satisfied. See e.g. Panavision Int'l., 141
F.3d at 1322; Nissan Motor Co., 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1160; Grimandi v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 512 F. Supp. 764 (D. Kan. 1981). This standard is
satisfied if "but for" the defendant's forum-related conduct the plaintiff
would not have been injured. In Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, the
Ninth Circuit noted that a "but for" test is appropriate because it maintains the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction while preserving the requirement that there be some nexus between the claim and
the defendant's forum activities. 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd
on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
This Court should follow trends in other jurisdictions by holding
that Tekhead's claims need not arise directly from Dospam's forum contacts to be sufficiently related as to warrant the exercise of specific jurisdiction. Presuming that this State adopts a "but for" test, the issue here
is whether Tekhead's claims against Dospam would have arisen "but for"
Dospam's forum-related conduct of sending an unsolicited prank e-mail
to Tekhead. It is incontrovertible that if not for Dospam's e-mail,
Tekhead would not have appeared to have violated Distress' Employee
Handbook by using his computer for personal business or viewing pornography on his computer and that Tekhead would not have been discharged. Further, were it not for Dospam's e-mail the unauthorized
intrusion into Tekhead's workplace environment or his Microsoft Outlook address book would not have occurred.
Even if this Court were to adopt a more stringent "substantial connection" test, it is still evident that the nexus between Dospam's conduct
and Tekhead's claims was sufficiently substantial to comport with due
process requirements. Dospam's conduct was more than substantiallyrelated to Tekhead's injury and subsequent claims. It was integrallyrelated to those claims. Before receiving Dospam's June 13, 2002 e-mail
Tekhead was considered an "exemplary employee." (R. at 4.) He had
received a favorable performance evaluation and had recently been recommended for Distress' Employee of the Month award. (R. at 4.)
Tekhead had never violated, nor was he suspected of violating, Distress'
Computer Policy before receiving Dospam's e-mail. Dospam's e-mail
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made it appear that Tekhead was using his work computer for personal
business and that he was using it to view pornography. Both activities,
if true, would have been violations of Distress' Employee Handbook. (R.
at 3.) Distress discharged Tekhead because of Tekhead's apparent violation of its Employee Handbook. (R. at 5.) The e-mail was integrally-related to Distress' decision to discharge Tekhead because Dospam's
unsolicited e-mail, which caused a disturbance, was the one and only
source for Distress' belief that Tekhead had violated its Employee Handbook. Because a substantial connection exists between Dospam's forumrelated conduct, his directing a "gag" promotional e-mail toward
Tekhead, and Tekhead's injury, Tekhead's claim must be considered to
have "arisen out of' Dospam's contacts with the forum.
3.

The exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable because it
comports with notions of fair play and substantialjustice

Dospam has not demonstrated that Marshall's exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him would be unreasonable. Requiring defendants to
have minimum contacts with the forum State protects defendants from
the burden of having to litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum.
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291. "[This] protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness.'
The relationship between a forum State and a defendant must be such
that it is reasonable to require the defendant to defend a particular suit
where it is brought." Id. at 292. Once a court establishes that a defendant has purposefully availed himself of the forum, the defendant's "contacts [with the forum State] may be considered in light of other factors to
determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction would comport with 'fair
play and substantial justice.' Minimum requirements inherent in the
concept of fair play and substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction." Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476-78. To defeat
jurisdiction, a defendant "must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id. In considering whether jurisdiction comports with notions of
fair play and substantial justice and, thus, is reasonable, courts typically
weigh five factors:
(1) The burden on the defendant of defending his suit in the forum
State;
(2) The interests of the forum State in adjudicating the dispute;
(3) The plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief;
(4) The interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies; and
(5) The shared interests of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
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Asahi Metal Indus., 480 U.S. at 113.
Based on undisputed facts in the record, Dospam has not met his
burden of demonstrating that Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction offends
due process. None of the five factors weigh strongly in Dospam's favor.
On the contrary, the factors indicate that it is not unreasonable to require Dospam to defend his suit in Marshall. With respect to factor one,
requiring Dospam to litigate in Marshall would not "make litigation 'so
gravely difficult and inconvenient'" so as to place Dospam "unfairly ... at
a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent." Burger King
Corp., 471 U.S. at 478. Dospam grew up in Marshall and currently resides in the neighboring State of Potter. Considering advances in telecommunications and transportation, Dospam's burden of litigating in
Marshall, while not insignificant, is certainly not so onerous as to be unreasonable. As for factor two, Marshall has a strong interest in providing its citizens with a convenient and effective means of redress for
tortious conduct committed by nonresident. Regarding factor three,
Tekhead's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief should be
afforded substantial weight. As a result of Dospam's contacts with Marshall, Tekhead was discharged by Distress, his former employer. Fairness dictates that Tekhead, now unemployed, should not be forced to
bear the burden of litigating in a foreign jurisdiction. Balancing Dospam's burden in defending in Marshall versus Tekhead's interest in relief, it is clear that Tekhead, as the injured party, should not have to
endure further inconvenience to his life in order to receive redress.
Factor four, the interstate judicial system's interest in efficiency, is
fairly neutral. Witnesses are located in both Marshall and Potter, while
physical evidence and records are located in these two states and in Monaco where Webgags' Web site and e-mail service are hosted. Distress's
retention of electronic evidence tips the balance slightly in favor of Marshall. Conversely, litigating in Potter offers no compelling advantages in
terms of judicial efficiency. Finally, regarding factor five, the shared interests of the several States will be best served by allowing Marshall to
assert jurisdiction over Dospam. That is, states have a strong policy interest in working together to prevent persons committing tortious conduct over the Internet from hiding behind jurisdictional lines based on
the erroneous concept that conduct over the Internet is somehow "different" and normal rules regarding jurisdiction do not apply.
Based on these five factors, Dospam has not presented a "compelling
case" that Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.
Thus, as Dospam purposefully availed himself of the State of Marshall
and Tekhead's claims arose out of Dospam's contacts with the State of
Marshall, Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction over Dospam comports with
the Due Process Clause.
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"[Tihe so-called Internet revolution has spawned a host of new legal
issues as courts have struggled to apply traditional legal frameworks to
this new communications medium." Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 266. Even
in the Internet age, however, the fact remains that a state generally has
a "manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents." McGee v.Int'l. Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). The undisputed facts in the instant case demonstrate that a genuine issue of
material fact exists as to whether Marshall may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Dospam. In denying Dospam's motion for summary judgment as to this issue, the lower courts applied well-settled
rules governing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants and also followed emerging trends as regards the application of traditional personal
jurisdiction doctrines to Internet-specific cases. This Court should apply
the same tests as the lower courts in denying Dospam's motion for summary judgment as to the issue of personal jurisdiction.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURT'S DECISION THAT TEKHEAD FAILED TO ESTABLISH A
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TORTIOUS INTRUSION UPON
SECLUSION AND PUBLICITY IN A FALSE LIGHT
The Court of Appeals improperly upheld summary judgment for
Dospam on Tekhead's claims of intrusion upon seclusion ("intrusion")
and false light invasion of privacy ("false light"). By adopting The RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS the Marshall courts recognized that an
unreasonable intrusion upon his seclusion or the public portrayal of a
person in an offensive manner violates a person's right to privacy. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§652B, 652D (1977). Tekhead's privacy rights were violated when Dospam tortiously induced him to open
an e-mail that displayed offensive images, played an offensive audio
stream, and accessed and absconded with the contents of his password
protected e-mail address book.
Tekhead should succeed on his intrusion claim because Dospam invaded his private affairs without authorization in a manner that would
be offensive to a reasonable person, and which caused Tekhead pain and
suffering. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652B. The parties agree
that Dospam's unauthorized access of Tekhead's e-mail address book
was offensive to a reasonable person and that it caused pain and suffering. The appellate court erred however, in finding that the unauthorized
access of Tekhead's address book was not an intrusion and that the information in it was not private.
To succeed on the false light claim Tekhead must demonstrate that
Dospam was reckless in inaccurately portraying him in a manner that
would be offensive to a reasonable person in his situation. RESTATEMENT
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TORTS §652E; see also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and
Keeton on the Law of Torts, §117 at 863 (5th ed. 1984). As the parties
stipulated that the false light was offensive to a reasonable person and
that Dospam acted with actual malice, this Court must rule only on the
appellate court's erroneous finding that the wrongful portrayal of
Tekhead was not public.
(SECOND) OF

A.

DosPAM INVADED TEKHEAD'S PRIVACY RIGHTS BY His

UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS AND USE OF THE PRIVATE CONTENTS
OF TEKHEAD'S E-MAIL ADDRESS BOOK.

To succeed on his intrusion claim Tekhead must demonstrate that
Dospam's access and use of his e-mail address book was an unauthorized
intrusion upon his seclusion, that the intrusion was offensive to a reasonable person, that the contents of the e-mail address book were private, and that the intrusion caused anguish and suffering. (R. at 10); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652B. The parties stipulated at
trial that the intrusion was offensive to a reasonable person and that it
caused anguish and suffering. (R. at 10.) Accordingly, this Court must
rule on the appellate court's improper decision that Dospam's unauthorized access and use of Tekhead's e-mail address book was not intrusive
and that its contents were not private with respect to individuals not
employed by Distress Technologies. (R. at 10.)
This Court should remand the appellate court's improper finding
that Dospam's unauthorized access and use of Tekhead's e-mail address
book was not a tortious invasion of his privacy. Tekhead had both a subjective and objective expectation that his e-mail address book would not
be accessed by non-Distress employees. By tortiously inducing Tekhead
to open an offensive e-mail, and by appropriating the contents of his email address book, Dospam violated Tekhead's "right to be let alone"
which is recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States as a fundamental freedom. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); see also, Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
The appellate court erred in granting Dospam's Motion for Summary
Judgment on the intrusion claim because Tekhead's e-mail address book
is subjectively and objectively private, and because Dospam's violation of
that privacy is a tortious intrusion upon his seclusion.
1.

The contents of Tekhead's e-mail address book, containingpersonal
and business contacts, were private

Tekhead may establish that his e-mail address book was private by
demonstrating an actual, subjective expectation that its contents were
private and that this expectation is objectively reasonable. Medical Lab.
Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2002);
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see also Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 71 (Cal. 1999), People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) v. Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995). Tekhead's use of a password to protect his account and his reliance upon Distress' Computer Policy manifest his subjective expectation that his e-mail address book would not be accessed by
non-Distress employees. Similarly, Tekhead's reliance on Distress' Computer Policy demonstrates that his expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable. Courts have held that a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in e-mail accounts. Additionally, the privacy of e-mail is objectively reasonable because it lies at the technological nexus of the telephone and the U.S. mail, both of which are Constitutionally protected.
a)

Tekhead had a subjective expectation that his e-mail address book
was private because his account was password protected and he
relied upon Distress' Computer Policy

By using a password to protect the contents of his e-mail address
book Tekhead manifested a subjective expectation that the contents of
the account were private. In Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultantsv. Am. Broad.
Co., 306 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit Federal Court of
Appeals held that a subjective expectation of privacy may be demonstrated by "any outward manifestations that [Petitioner] expected [the
matter] to be private." A subjective expectation of privacy is demonstrated by comparing the actual precautions Tekhead took to safeguard
this information with the precautions he might reasonably have taken to
protect the privacy of that information. Id.; see also Dow Chem. Co. v.
U.S., 749 F.2d 307, 312-13 (6th Cir. 1984). Tekhead demonstrated a subjective expectation that his e-mail address book was private by using a
password to protect his e-mail account.
Tekhead's use of a password to protect his e-mail address book account manifests his subjective expectation that the contents of his e-mail
address book were private. The Computer Policy signed by Tekhead
states that e-mail accounts are password protected to guard Distress'
proprietary information against unauthorized access. (Exhibit A.) By
signing the Computer Policy Tekhead agreed to use the password protection, and used a password each time he accessed his account. There is no
other, more reasonable method of protecting this information, particularly in light of Distress' Computer Policy. Tekhead therefore manifested his subjective expectation that the contents of this e-mail address
book were private by using a password protected system.
The Computer Policy implies that, while Distress may access the
contents on Tekhead's account, Tekhead maintained a reasonable expectation that his privacy would not be invaded by third parties. While the
Policy states that "Employees should not expect privacy in using the
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Company's electronic information systems," this provision applies only to
privacy violations by a Distress employee. Tekhead expected that his
communications would be monitored by Distress employees. He only
consented however, to Distress monitoring his account, and therefore retained a subjective expectation that the contents of his e-mail address
book would not be susceptible to intrusion by a third party. Moreover,
because Distress monitors its information systems so closely, Tekhead
was reasonably certain that he would not be opening offensive and inappropriate e-mail because he assumed that Distress was screening incoming correspondence. Tekhead manifested a subjective expectation that
the contents of his e-mail address book would not be accessed because he
employed a reasonable method of protecting his confidential information
and adhered to Distress' Computer Policy.
b)

Tekhead's belief that his e-mail address book was private is
objectively reasonable

In the information age where telecommunications abound it is objectively reasonable to expect that e-mail communications are private. See
e.g. U.S. v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 575 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995). As
Justice Brandeis noted in Olmstead v. United States, "Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific abuses of power, must
have a . . .capacity of adaptation to the changing world." 277 U.S. at
472. Tekhead's expectation that the contents of his e-mail address book
would remain private is objectively reasonable because e-mail lies at the
nexus of two constitutionally protected means of communication, the
telephone and ordinary mail. Courts recognize that privacy rights extend to ordinary mail, Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967
(E.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966 (3rd Cir. 1976),
and to telephone conversations. See e.g. Fowler v. S. Bell Tel. Co., 343
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965). It is therefore reasonable to expect that privacy
extends to e-mail, which is simply a blend of the telephone and ordinary
mail. Moreover, as Distress' Computer Policy clearly states that Distress
is protecting its electronic privacy, Tekhead's expectation that the contents of his e-mail address book were private was objectively reasonable.
Courts have clearly stated that the US Mail and telephone conversations are private. In Birnbaum the court recognized that the unauthorized opening of mail is actionable as an intrusion upon seclusion.
Similarly, in Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973), the Texas
Supreme Court found that wiretapping was an actionable invasion of privacy. The court noted that "tapping of telephone wires, of course, was an
unknown possibility at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted.
But eavesdropping was . . recognized [as] 'an ancient practice which at
common law was condemned as a nuisance." Id. at 860. Privacy rights
were thus extended from eavesdropping to tapping telephone wires be-
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cause "the increased complexity and intensity of modern civilization and
the development of man's spiritual sensibilities have rendered man more
sensitive to publicity and have increased his need for privacy." Id. Both
wiretapping and the unauthorized opening of mail are actionable as an
invasion of privacy. Analogously, Dospam's unauthorized access of
Tekhead's e-mail address book is similarly actionable as an intrusion
upon Tekhead's seclusion.
E-mail, which is a technological blend of the telephone and letters,
has been explicitly recognized as private. In United States v. Maxwell,
42 M.J. 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), the Air Force Court of Criminal
Appeals found that there was an objectively reasonable expectation that
messages stored in computers, and specifically in e-mail transmitted
over America Online, were private. The court noted, "[iun the modern age
of communications, society must recognize such expectations of privacy
as reasonable." Id. The court also stated that recognition of e-mail as
private is implicit in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Id.,
citing, 18 U.S.C. §2210 et seq. E-mail was also recognized as private in
Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914
(W.D.Wis. 2002), where the court found that summary judgment was improperly granted in an intrusion claim for the unauthorized access of an
e-mail account.
Some cases explicitly recognize e-mail as private while others draw
an analogy to the telephone or mail. It is clear however, that courts recognize that technological advancements require e-mail communications
to be protected as private. Tekhead's expectation that his e-mail address
book would be private is therefore recognized under the law as objectively reasonable.
Distress' Computer Policy similarly demonstrates that Tekhead
could reasonably expect that his e-mail address book would not be accessed by unauthorized personnel. Distress recognized that an expectation that e-mail is private is objectively reasonable by providing that
"Employees should not expect privacy in using the Company's electronic
information systems." (Exhibit A.) By signing the Computer Policy
Tekhead waived his privacy rights only with respect to Distress. He retained a privacy interest in the contents of his e-mail account with respect to anyone not employed by Distress, and specifically with respect to
Dospam. The terms of the Policy clearly indicate that Distress recognized that Tekhead's expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable.
2.

Dospam's unauthorized access of Tekhead's e-mail account was
intrusive

Dospam's access and use of Tekhead's e-mail address book was unauthorized, nonconsensual and offensive, which shows that it was
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wrongful, unwanted, and legally cognizable as an intrusion. The parties
stipulated that Dospam's "intrusion" was offensive to a reasonable person and that it caused anguish and suffering. (R. at 10.) Dospam's conduct was obviously an intrusion because the court repeatedly referred to
it as such. Alternatively, the conduct is intrusive because it is unauthorized, and therefore unwanted. Dospam's conduct was clearly an intrusion because the appellate court described it as such and because it was
unauthorized.
The appellate Court's repeated reference to Dospam's conduct as an
"intrusion" establishes to a legal certainty that the conduct was in fact
intrusive. The court stated that "Dospam's intrusion into Tekhead's
workplace environment (i.e., his computer) and his Microsoft Outlook address book was unauthorized." (R. at 10) (emphasis added). It is therefore apparent on the face of the opinion that Dospam's conduct was an
intrusion. While the Court goes on to state that one of the issues is
"whether the alleged conduct constitutes an unauthorized intrusion or
prying into Tekhead's seclusion" it is clear from the record that the Court
already found that the conduct was an intrusion.
Alternatively, Dospam's access of Tekhead's e-mail address book
was an intrusion simply because it was unauthorized and unwanted. In
Hill v. MCI Worldcom Comm., Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1205, (S.D. Iowa
2001), the court defined the term "intrude" as "to thrust oneself in without invitation, permission, or welcome." Citing, O'Donnell v. U.S., 891
F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1187, (1996)). An "intrusion" is similarly defined as "the act
of 'wrongfully entering upon, seizing, or taking possession of the property
of another . . . and occurs 'when an actor 'believes or is substantially
certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive act.'" Id. at 1209. Dospam's conduct was an intrusion
under these definitions because it was a wrongful and unauthorized entry into Tekhead's private life. Tekhead did not give Dospam permission
to access and abscond with the contents of his e-mail address book.
Moreover, Dospam knew or should have known that he did not have permission to enter Tekhead's password protected e-mail account. Dospam
clearly intruded upon Tekhead's seclusion by accessing and using
Tekhead's e-mail address book because the court recognized this conduct
as an intrusion and because it was done without Tekhead's
authorization.
Dospam invaded Tekhead's privacy by accessing and using the contents of his e-mail address book because its contents were private and
because the access of the e-mail address book was intrusive. Tekhead
manifested a subjective expectation that the contents of his e-mail address book were private because he used a password to protect the account and because he relied on Distress' Computer Policy. Tekhead's
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expectation that his e-mail address book was private was objectively reasonable because e-mail is recognized as private, and because it is analogous to telephone communication and the U.S. Mail, which are also
recognized as private. Dospam invaded this private space by accessing
and using the contents of Tekhead's e-mail address book because the conduct was intrusive and not authorized. It is therefore clear that the appellate court improperly granted Dospam's Motion for Summary
Judgment because genuine issues of material fact remain as to
Tekhead's intrusion claim.
B.

DosPAM

PUBLICLY PLACED TEKHEAD IN A FALSE LIGHT BY

TORTIOUSLY INDUCING HIM TO OPEN AN OFFENSIVE AND DISRUPTIVE
MAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF

His

E-

CO-WORKERS

The District Court's decision should be reversed because there is evidence demonstrating that Tekhead was placed in a false light before the
public. The State of Marshall adheres to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS in its analysis of a false light privacy tort, which requires that
Tekhead demonstrate that he was placed in a false light before the public
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and that Dospam
acted with actual malice in placing Tekhead in this light. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652E. The parties have stipulated that the
latter two elements are not in dispute, so the remaining issue is whether
Tekhead was placed in a false light before the public.
1.

Dospam placed Tekhead in a false light by tricking him into
opening the Webgags e-mail

The tort of false light invasion of privacy requires a "public disclosure of falsity or fiction concerning the plaintiff." Hoskins v. Howard, 971
P.2d 1135, 1140 (Idaho 1998). Without material falsehood there can be
no recovery. Id. Dospam's e-mail disclosed a falsity about Tekhead by
publicly warning the recipient to stop viewing pornography, which give
the impression to all within earshot that Tekhead was viewing pornography at his desk or that he was misusing his computer by indulging in a
personal e-mail joke. Neither of these situations is true. On the contrary, Tekhead does not view pornography on his computer and he only
opened Dospam's e-mail because it appeared to contain legitimate business information originating from a high-ranking Distress employee.
To constitute a false light invasion of privacy a statement must be
false, and must also be a fictionalization of events or circumstances that
are represented to be true. See Davis v. High Socy. Mag., 457 N.Y.S. 2d
308, 315 (Sup. Ct. 1982). A plaintiffs claim will be barred only if the
statements at issue "[cannot reasonably] be understood as describing actual facts about a plaintiff or actual events in which he has participated."
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Pringv. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982). In Dworkin
v. Hustler Magazine, 668 F. Supp. 1408 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the court addressed this issue in dismissing a claim for false light. In that case, feminist Andrea Dworkin was named by Hustler Magazine in sexually
graphic cartoons. The court dismissed the action however, because while
the depictions of Dworkin were certainly false, they were not represented
to be true. The court stated that, "no reasonable reader would interpret
these exhibits as expressing statements of fact." Id. at 1420.
Tekhead's claim sharply contrasts with the claim in Dworkin because the e-mail's warning and disruptive nature could be reasonably
understood as depicting actual facts. It would be reasonable for any of
Tekehad's co-workers or superiors to believe that he was viewing pornography on his computer. Further, once it was discovered that the e-mail
was a joke, Tekhead's superiors could reasonably perceive the incident as
a voluntary prank in which Tekhead intended to engage. While the
viewers of the graphic cartoons in Dworkin could quickly ascertain the
cartoon's satirical nature, Tekhead's co-workers would be justified in believing the incident to be actual fact.
While many false light claims involve a published statement by one
person about another, written disclosure is not the only means to satisfy
a false light claim. In Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 306
F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962), the court held that a "publication" of an implied
incorrect representation would support an invasion of privacy claim. In
that case, all four tires were removed from plaintiffs vehicle while it sat
in the parking lot of the country club where he was employed. Id. at 10.
The car was left standing on its four rims in plain view of fellow employees and country club members. Id. While there were no statements regarding the incident, the action incorrectly and tortiously implied that
the plaintiff was delinquent in his payments on the tires. Id.
As in Santiesteban, there were no direct statements made about
Tekhead, but the e-mail very clearly implied certain facts about
Tekhead. Everyone who witnessed the incident could reasonably infer
that Tekhead was violating Distress' Computer Policy, when in fact he
was the victim of a cruel joke. As a result of this implication, a false
representation was made of Tekhead's character and behavior.
The appellate court incorrectly found that genuine issues of material
fact exist as to whether Tekhead was placed in a false light. Dospam's email caused a disturbance that ultimately led to Tekhead's dismissal. A
reasonable person can conclude that the inaccurate portrayal of Tekhead
as one who engages in inappropriate activities at the office was understood by his co-workers and superiors to be true. This inaccurate portrayal of Tekhead is actionable in the the State of Marshall as a claim for
false light.
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Tekhead's co-workers constitute the public because of their special
relationship with Tekhead

The appellate incorrectly found an absence of genuine issue of material with respect to the publicity element of the false light claim. By relying upon an antiquated definition about what is "public" the court
erroneously found that Tekhead was not tortiously placed in a false light
before the public.
It is undisputed that the publicity requirement is satisfied when a
disclosure of false facts is made to the public at large, or to so many people that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become
one of public knowledge. Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio App.
1997). Courts however, have become increasingly willing to consider disclosure to smaller groups as a basis for a false light claim. The determining factor has been the degree of damage suffered by the plaintiff. For
instance, in Biedermans' of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892
(Mo. 1959), a husband and wife were forced to seek employment elsewhere as a result of an embarrassing altercation that took place at the
wife's place of work. The couple was accused of being "deadbeats" by a
collection agent in a "loud, degrading and threatening manner." Id. at
892. The accusation took place at the wife's waitressing job in the presence of numerous restaurant patrons. Id. While the analysis focused on
whether the publication was oral, the publicity element was satisfied due
to the emotional distress and the widespread and lasting damage caused
by disclosure to the restaurant patrons. Id. at 896.
The idea that the severity of damage has an effect on the publicity
element has led to a widely accepted rule concerning the extent of publicity required for invasion of privacy claims. This rule creates a distinction
between public and private figures in terms of what constitutes "the
public."
Such a public might be the general public, if the person were a public
figure, or a particularpublic such as fellow employees, club members,
church members, family or neighbors, if the person were not a public
figure.
Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977) (emphasis added). This language was relied upon in McSurely v. McClelland, 753
F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir. 1985), as the court considered a long line of precedent
and observed that prior cases consistently indicated that "the size of the
public [is] not relevant to whether a disclosure of embarrassing facts [is]
tortiuous." Id. at 76; see also Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 174 S.W.2d 510
(Ky. 1943); Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1951); Sellers v.
Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214 (Ky. 1959).
With respect to the number of individuals sufficient to constitute a
particular public, the Beaumont court "[did] not engage in a numbers
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game." 401 N.W.2d at 532. In declining to place a numerical requirement on the publication element it stated:
An invasion of a plaintiffs right to privacy is important if it exposes
private facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff.
Id. The court also observed that precedent supported the idea that "publication of the embarrassing facts to only one person alone was unlawful
publication." Id. at 529. Tekhead was embarrassed when the particular
public present on June 13, 2002 gained knowledge of the incorrect facts
about his workplace habits. Tekhead worked diligently to gain the respect of his co-workers, but the results of his hard work vanished in a few
short moments due to his inaccurate portrayal before the public caused
by Dospam's e-mail.
The logic of the Beaumont's decision is readily applied to cases
where one is disparaged in the presence of co-workers. In Miller v. Motorola, 560 N.E.2d 900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), the court reversed a finding of
summary judgment for the defendant. There, an employee sued her employer seeking recovery for damages resulting from the employer's disclosure of her mastectomy surgery to her fellow employees. Id. at 977.
In analyzing the "public disclosure" element of her claim the court held
that "the public disclosure requirement may be satisfied by proof that
the plaintiff has a special relationship with the 'public' to whom the information is disclosed." Id. at 903 (emphasis added). The court's rationale is that such a disclosure "may be just as devastating to the person
even though the disclosure was made to a limited number of people." Id.
The court specifically held that co-workers have a "special relationship"
with one another stating, "[p]laintifTs allegation that her medical condition was disclosed to her fellow employees sufficiently satisfies the requirement that publicity be given to the private fact." Id.
Courts continue to rely on the wisdom of Beaumont and Miller in
determining when a statement is made publicly. Herion v. Village of
Bensensville, No. 00-C-1026, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16745 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
1, 2000) (unreported), and Austin, Eberhardt & Donaldson, Corp. v.
Youngman, No. 00-C-3303, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1090 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
29, 2001) (unreported), follow the logic of the Beaumont court and are
good law today. In Herion, the plaintiff brought a claim of false light
after being maliciously accused of various criminal conduct in the presence of co-workers and employers. The court found that the false light
claim sufficiently pled disclosure of private information before the public
because individuals to whom information was disclosed had a "special
relationship" with the plaintiffs. Id. In Austin, the court concluded that
while the publicity requirement may be satisfied by disclosure to the
public at large, it may also be satisfied by disclosure to a smaller group of
people with whom the plaintiff has a special relationship. 2001 U.S.
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Dist. LEXIS 1090 at 21. The Austin court cited Miller and specified this
group as "a public whose knowledge of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff." Id.; see also Miller, 560 N.E.2d at 903.
Applying well-settled precedent to this case it is clear that the appellate court erroneously eliminated Tekhead's false light claim. The parties stipulated that the individuals who witnessed the incident on June
13, 2002 were co-workers of Tekhead. As such, they are considered to
have a special relationship with him, which is sufficient to establish the
publicity requirement.
The opening of the June 13 e-mail set off a chain reaction of events
that placed Tekhead in a false light before his co-workers. His co-workers and superiors reasonably believed that Tekhead blatantly violated
Distress's Computer Policy. This apparent violation led to the sudden
termination of Tekhead's employment with Distress. Had the incident
been published in a newspaper article, the violations of Tekhead's privacy would have been negligible because the public at large is unconcerned with Tekhead's performance at his job. Tekhead's co-worker's
however, have both a concern and a vested interest in his behavior and
therefore constitute the public under well-settled precedent.
Tekhead's status as a private individual makes the extent of the
publicity irrelevant. It is therefore not the size but the characteristics of
the group that is important. Since the characteristic of the group at issue is of co-workers having a "special relationship" with Tekhead, it necessarily follows that Tekhead has sufficiently demonstrated the only
element of his false light claim at issue on this appeal. It would therefore be improper for this Court to allow a judgment in favor of defendant
Dospam to stand.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff-Appellant Alexander Tekhead
respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand the decision of
the First District Court of Appeals for the State of Marshall so that all of
Plainitiff-Appellant's claim may be heard in a trial on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,

Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant
Alexander Tekhead
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APPENDIX A:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

(1977)

SECTION 652B
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
seclusion of another in his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
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APPENDIX B:
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977)
SECTION 652E
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the dales light in which the other
would be placed.
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APPENDIX C:
Marshall Revised Code
Section 735 MRC 25-302.
A tribunal of the State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would
be subject to jurisdiction under this subsection if not deceased) who acts
directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising
from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this State ....
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT HAS PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER

DoSPAM

WHEN ONE OF

Dos-

PAM'S UNSOLICITED PROMOTIONAL EMAILS GAVE RISE TO TEKHEAD'S
CLAIMS FOR FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY AND INTRUSION UPON
SECLUSION, AND ALSO DIRECTLY RESULTED IN TEKHEAD'S TERMINA-

TION FROM DISTRESS?

II.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TEKHEAD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS TO EVIDENCE A THEORY OF FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY AS DEFINED BY THE
STATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

TORTS

WHEN

DOSPAM

RE-

INTENTIONALLY

TRANSMITTED AN EMAIL MESSAGE THAT CREATED THE FALSE IMPRESSION AMONG TEKHEAD'S COLLEAGUES THAT HE VIEWED PORNOGRAPHY
ON HIS WORKPLACE COMPUTER, AND AS A RESULT, DIRECTLY LED TO
HIS TERMINATION?

III.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TEKHEAD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS TO EVIDENCE A THEORY OF INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION AS DEFINED BY THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS WHEN

DoSPAM

SURREPTITIOUSLY ACCESSED

AND PILFERED THE CONTENTS OF TEKHEAD'S WORKPLACE MICROSOFT
OUTLOOK ADDRESS BOOK?
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TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MARSHALL:
Petitioner, Alexander Tekhead, respectfully submits this brief in support of his request that this Honorable Court reverse the judgment of the
court of appeals as to the false light invasion of privacy and intrusion
upon seclusion claims, and affirm the judgment as to personal jurisdiction in favor of Petitioner.
OPINIONS BELOW
The Farbrook County Circuit Court denied in part and granted in part
summary judgment Respondent's motion for summary judgment. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall affirmed in part
and denied in part the circuit court's order granting summary judgment
in case number 02-CV-6245.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
A formal statement ofjurisdiction is omitted in accordance with section
1020(5) of the rules for the Twenty Second Annual John Marshall Law
School Moot Court Competition in Information Technology and Privacy
Law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Alexander Tekhead (hereinafter "Tekhead"), a citizen of the state of
Marshall, began his employment at Distress Technologies (hereinafter
"Distress") on June 20, 2000. (R. at 3.) Distress is a company incorporated in and with its principal place of business in the state of Marshall.
(R. at 2, 3.) On December 6, 2000, Tekhead received his initial performance review, and as a result, was granted permanent status. (R. at 3, 4.)
As a new employee, Tekhead received a copy of the Distress Employee Handbook (hereinafter "The Handbook"). (R. at 3.) The Handbook articulates Distress' policies with respect to the workplace, and
contains guidelines specifically concerning the use of Distress' computers. (R. at 3); (See Exhibit A-1.) Distress' Electronic Information Systems Policy (hereinafter "EISP") states the Company's concern with
"protecting [their] confidential and proprietary information and [to]
avoid misuse of its electronic information systems." (R. at A-1.) The
EISP reserves Distress' right to "access, monitor, and disclose communications and information stored in, transmitted from, or received by any
part of its electronic information systems.. ." (See Exhibit A-1.) Further,
"e-mail... are subject to review and use by authorized Company representatives and by third parties. . .as the Company, in its discretion,
deems necessary or appropriate." (R. at A-1.) Also, the EISP expressly
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states that "[e]mployees should not expect privacy in using the Company's electronic information systems," that "[a]ll passwords and access
codes are the Company's property." (R. at A-1.)
The guidelines relevant to this action provide that an employee may
not (1) use Distress' computers for personal use; (2) use any Distress
computers to retrieve, store, or view offensive, obscene, or threatening
content; or (3) use any computer equipment in a manner that is excessive, loud, or disturbing to other employees. (R. at 3.) The Handbook
states that Distress reserves the right to monitor the use of its communications systems at its discretion and without notice, and that misuse of
any of the information systems may result in disciplinary action up to
and including termination. (R. at 3.)
Subsequent to his June 20, 2001 performance review, Tekhead became a model employee. (R. at 4.) Both his attitude and professional
demeanor significantly improved, and he excelled at his job. (R. at 4.) As
a result of his remarkable turnaround, Tekhead received favorable reviews in his December of 2001 performance evaluation. (R. at 4); (See
Exhibit C.) In April of 2002, Tekhead had improved to such an extent
that he was recommended by an immediate supervisor for the "Employee
of the Month" award. (R. at 4.)
On June 13, 2002, Tekhead received an unsolicited e-mail message
(hereinafter "June 13 e-mail") that deceptively appeared to be addressed
from one of Distress' senior managers with a subject line that read, "Documents for Review." (R. at 4.) Believing that the message related to his
upcoming performance review, which was scheduled for the following
week, Tekhead opened the e-mail. (R. at 4.) When the June 13 e-mail
was opened, an animated image of a naked George and Jane Jetson
dancing the fandango appeared on his computer screen. (R. at 5.) At the
same time, an audible message began to play the phrase, "ALERT! STOP
VIEWING PORN! CLOSE YOUR BROWSER IMMEDIATLEY!" at maximum volume. (R. at 5.) Despite Tekhead's efforts to close the June 13 email, he was unsuccessful, and the message continued to play. (R. at 5.)
As the message continued to play, at least five of Tekhead's coworkers
began to assemble around his computer. (R. at 5.) Tekhead's supervisor
attempted to shut down the offending display and audible message
through keyboard commands, but was unsuccessful, so he unplugged the
computer. (R. at 5.) The supervisor then directed Tekhead to leave for
the remainder of the day. (R. at 5.) The next day, Distress' general counsel placed a call to Tekhead and informed him of his termination. (R. at
5.)
Soon after his termination, Tekhead filed a wrongful discharge suit
against Distress, alleging that he did not willfully violate the Handbook.
(R. at 5.) During discovery in his suit against Distress, Tekhead discovered that the June 13 e-mail had originated with Allan Dospam (herein-
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after "Dospam"), and had been routed through a third-party relay server
in Korea, which forwarded the message to Distress. (R. at 5.) Based on
the unearthing of this information, Tekhead filed the instant suit
against Dospam for intrusion upon seclusion and false light invasion of
privacy. (R. at 5.)
Although Dospam is a citizen of and resides in the state of Potter,
which borders Marshall, he was raised in Marshall, where his parents
still reside. (R. at 6.) After his graduation from college, Dospam submitted his resume to Distress, along with several other high-technology
companies in Marshall and surrounding states. (R. at 6.) He ultimately
accepted a position with another employer in Potter. (R. at 6.)
Since 2001, Dospam has operated a commercial online joke service
through a Web site called Webgags.com (hereinafter "Webgags"). (R. at
6.) Although Webgags contains paid advertisements, Dospam claims
that the Web site has not realized a profit. (R. at 6.) The domain name
"webgags.com" is registered with OffshoreDomainNames, an ICANN 1
accredited registrar located in the Cayman Islands. (R. at 6.) Although
the name "Webgags Corporation" appears on the domain registration
and it lists a Grand Cayman address, no evidence has been presented to
indicate that Webgags is incorporated in any jurisdiction. (R. at 6.) The
Web site Webgags.com is hosted by Datahaven Hosting (hereinafter
"Datahaven"), a web hosting service located in Monaco. Datahaven also
provides e-mail services for Webgags. (R. at 6.) Dospam admitted in his
affidavit that the purpose of this complicated arrangement was to minimize his exposure to nuisance lawsuits. (R. at 6.)
Webgags allows its customers to play digital practical jokes on other
unsuspecting individuals by offering an assortment of gags that can be
sent to recipients through e-mail. (R. at 6.) Several "gags" are available,
including one that makes the recipient's computer screen appear as if
files are being deleted, and one that plays different loud noises or distracting songs. (R. at 6.) A Webgags customer can have one of the gags
sent to a specific individual e-mail address (hereinafter "target"). (R. at
6, 7.) When the target opens the e-mail, it takes control of the target's
computer and acts as the customer directed. (R. at 7.)
As a method of promoting Webgags, Dospam employed Internet "spiders." (R. at 7.) Spiders are software programs that search the World
Wide Web looking for e-mail addresses published on Web sites, and then
collect any e-mail addresses that are found. (R. at 7.) Dospam compiles
these addresses and sends unsolicited e-mails to them. (R. at 7.) Dospam's spiders collected the e-mails of all Distress employees from Distress' Web site, including Tekhead's. (R. at 7.) Dospam's unsolicited
promotional messages take the form of the June 13 e-mail that led to
1. The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
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Tekhead's termination. (R. at 7.) The messages also include a program
that secretly copies and transmits the contents of the target computer's
Microsoft Outlook address book to Dospam. (R. at 7.)
Immediately after receiving service of process for Tekhead's suit
against Dospam, Dospam published the contents of Tekhead's Outlook
address book on Webgags.com Web site. (R. at 7.) The Web page upon
which all of the e-mail addresses from Tekhead's Outlook address book
appeared included a statement that read, "Mr. Tekhead filed suit against
me, obviously, he can't take a joke. Here's his address book. Make him
pay for his lack of humor." (R. at 7, 8.) Tekhead's Outlook address book
contained not only professional contacts, but also several personal contacts, some of whom complained to Tekhead that they began receiving
spam after their e-mail addresses were published on the Webgags Web
site. (R. at 8.)
The Circuit Court of Cook County awarded summary judgment in
favor of Respondent as to Tekhead's false light invasion of privacy and
intrusion upon seclusion causes of action. (R. at 1.) The court denied
Respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. at
1.) Tekhead appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to
the false light invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion causes of
action. (R. at 1.)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Tekhead sued (Respondent) in the Circuit Court of Farbrook
County, State of Marshall, alleging false light invasion of privacy and
intrusion upon seclusion. (R. at 1.) The parties have stipulated to the
facts set forth in the record. (R. at 2.) The circuit court granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a matter of law,
Tekhead failed to prove :(1) false light invasion of privacy; and (2) invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion. (R. at 9-10.) The circuit
court denied Respondent's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. at 1.)
The First District Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's
granting of summary judgment because Tekhead failed to establish the
required elements for both claims. The court held that there was no indication that Respondent had cast Tekhead in a false light before the public, as required by the Restatement definition of the tort as followed by
the State of Marshall. (R. at 9.) Further, the court determined that Respondent's conduct did not amount to an intrusion or prying into a private matter under the Restatement definition of intrusion upon
seclusion, as followed by the State of Marshall. (R. at 10.) Finally, the
court rejected Respondent's challenge to the circuit court's determination
that personal jurisdiction was properly exercised over Respondent.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Respondent was proper because the exercise of such jurisdiction was both within the purview of the
Marshall long-arm statute and consistent with the basic principles of
due process. Respondent purposefully availed himself of the benefits of
conducting business in the State of Marshall when he sent Tekhead a
deceptively labeled, unsolicited, promotional e-mail message that gave
rise to Tekhead's claims for false light invasion of privacy and intrusion
upon seclusion. Several jurisdictions have held that in cases where an
intentional tort is committed, the tort occurs where the injury occurs. By
indiscriminately directing his unwanted e-mail message to a business in
this state, Respondent was afforded the opportunity to advertise his commercial venture to the residents of this state, including Tekhead. Since
the exercise of personal jurisdiction is plainly warranted by the events
related to Respondent's transmission of the June 13 e-mail, this court
must affirm the circuit court's determination that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Respondent was proper.
II.
Genuine issues of material fact remain at issue as to whether the unsolicited promotional e-mail message sent by Respondent caused Tekhead
to be placed in a false light before the public when "at least of five" of his
coworkers along with his supervisor were given the false impression that
Tekhead views pornography on his workplace computer. The injury suffered by Tekhead as a result of Respondent's transmission of the offensive e-mail program constituted an injury to his peace, happiness, and
feelings. A minority of jurisdictions have recognized that a false light
invasion of privacy that occurs in the workplace before a small number of
employees may be sufficient to satisfy the publicity requirement. Should
this Honorable Court determine that the record does not support a finding of widespread publicity under the majority Restatement approach,
justice requires the adoption of a special exception to the publicity requirement that recognizes the audience that the false light is portrayed
to. In the instant case, those who witnessed the offensive display caused
by Respondent's e-mail message were more influential in his life than an
anonymous public at large. Moreover, the adoption of the special exception to the widespread publicity requirement will allow Tekhead to recover for respondent's patently blameworthy and irresponsible acts.
Therefore, this Court must either remand for a determination by the
trial court that the publicity requirement has been satisfied, or adopt the
exception to the widespread publicity requirement and instruct the lower
court accordingly.
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III.

Respondent's unsolicited promotional e-mail message intruded into a
private matter of Tekhead when the attached computer program surreptitiously accessed his e-mail address book and transmitted to Respondent the private contents therein. The June 13 e-mail transmitted by
respondent acted as an electronic burglar that committed an unauthorized intrusion into a private matter of Tekhead. This Court must recognize the growing legal trend of holding cyber tortfeasors responsible for
their conduct online, and broaden traditional common law definitions to
adapt to new legal problems. Further, this Court must also recognize
that Tekhead possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace as to deceptive intrusions by those not authorized by the company
to access valuable company data in his charge. Therefore, the Court
must remand to the circuit court for determinations as to whether an
intrusion or prying occurred, and whether Tekhead possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy as to Respondent.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. RESPONDENT SUBJECTED HIMSELF TO PERSONAL
JURISDICTION IN THE STATE OF MARSHALL BY SENDING AN
UNSOLICITED PROMOTIONAL E-MAIL MESSAGE TO TEKHEAD
THAT GAVE RISE TO TEKHEAD'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR
FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF PRIVACY AND INTRUSION
UPON SECLUSION
Years before the advent of the Internet, courts in this country were
fully cognizant that the concept of personal jurisdiction would have to
adapt in tandem with society's increasing reliance on technology. For
example, Chief Justice Harlan Stone, in the landmark decision in International Shoe v. Washington, suggested that a personal jurisdiction
analysis can never be a rigidly applicable test, but rather, must be an
evolving constitutional standard that adapts to a changing society. 326
U.S. 310, 319 (1945). In 1958, Chief Justice Earl Warren predicted, "[a]s
technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between
States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less
burdensome." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-251 (1958). Courts
now confront worldwide access to web pages, e-mail contracts, and other
electronic business relationships in deciding whether an assertion of personal jurisdiction satisfies constitutional muster. See Keith S.
Dubanevich & Gary J. Strauss, PersonalJurisdictionin a Virtual World,
66 TEX. B.J. 131, 131 (2003). As courts examine Internet-related claims,
there is an apparent decline in the level of contacts needed to sustain
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assertions of personal jurisdiction. Id at 135. Thus, Chief Justices Stone
and Warren could not have made more insightful predictions.
Traditionally, to determine the validity of exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, a court performs a two-step analysis. See, e.g., World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodsen, 444 U.S. 286, 290-291
(1980). First, the court looks to the state's long-arm statute, which authorizes personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. See id. If
the criteria set forth in the state long-arm statute are satisfied, the court
then performs a second step, which involves a constitutional inquiry. See
id. Where state long-arm statutes extend jurisdiction to the full extent
allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the
State of Marshall's long-arm statute does, the court will collapse the two
steps and perform a single due process inquiry. See id. The majority of
the circuit courts of appeal have held that such statutes should be construed liberally in favor of finding personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. See, e.g., Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of
Toronto Innovations Found., 297 F.3d 1393, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
In the instant case, personal jurisdiction properly lies in the State of
Marshall. As discussed in the sections that follow, Respondent committed intentional acts outside of this state that had dire consequences
within the State of Marshall. Even where a defendant has no physical
presence in the forum state, a single purposeful contact is sufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction if the cause of action arises from that contact. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). "By sending
an e-mail solicitation to the far reaches of the earth for pecuniary gain,
one does so at her own peril, and cannot then claim that it is not reasonably foreseeable that she will be haled into court in a distant jurisdiction
to answer for the ramifications of that solicitation." Internet Doorway,
Inc. v. Parks, (S.D. Miss. 2001) 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 779-80.
Respondent must not be permitted to take advantage of modern
technology via the Internet or other electronic means to escape traditional notions of jurisdiction. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the circuit court's rejection of
Respondent's challenge to personal jurisdiction in the State of Marshall
must be affirmed.
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SENDING AN UNSOLICITED PROMOTIONAL E-MAIL MESSAGE THAT

CAUSED TEKHEAD TO BE PORTRAYED IN A FALSE LIGHT AND

By

APPROPRIATING INFORMATION STORED ON HIS WORKPLACE COMPUTER
THAT ULTIMATELY CAUSED TEKHEAD'S TERMINATION, RESPONDENT
ESTABLISHED SUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE STATE OF
MARSHALL So AS TO MAKE THE EXERCISE OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION PROPER

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over Respondent was proper because the exercise of such jurisdiction was both within the purview of the
Marshall long-arm statute and consistent with the basic principles of
due process. The Marshall long arm statute provides in pertinent part
that: "[a] tribunal of the State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person . . . who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or
other matter arising from such person: (1) Transacting any business in
this State." MARSHALL REVISED CODE, 735 MRC 25-302 (2003). Marshall courts interpret the reach of the long-arm statute coextensive with
that permitted by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (R. at 8.)
If statutory jurisdiction exists, the court must then evaluate
whether the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction comports with the due process clause. Because Marshall's long-arm statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state
law and federal due process are the same. PanavisionInt'l L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). Due process requires that the
non-resident defendant have at least "minimum contacts" with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
Under most long-arm statutes, state courts may exercise either general or specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, depending on
the nature of the contacts with the forum state. See HelicopterosNacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-415 (1984). General
jurisdiction is proper only where a defendant's contacts with the forum
state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the plaintiffs
action is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state. See id.
Even though it appears that Respondent's contacts with the state of
Marshall were not "continuous" or "systematic," Respondent's contacts in
the case at bar do allow for the application of specific jurisdiction. To
obtain specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, plaintiff must
show that three requirements have been satisfied: (1) the non-resident
defendant must have purposefully directed his activities or consummated some transaction with the forum or resident thereof, or perform
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some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates
to defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be
reasonable. See, e.g., Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111
(9th Cir. 2002). The minimum contacts requirement is usually satisfied
if the non-resident defendant "purposefully avails" himself of the benefits of doing business in the forum state. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler
Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1986). Recent cases involving intentional
tort claims have utilized an "effects test" to determine whether a nonresident defendant's conduct rises to the level of purposeful availment.
See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 783-787 (1984). As discussed below,
specific jurisdiction is proper because Respondent's conduct in the instant case satisfies all three requirements.
For the reasons discussed in the sections that follow, this Court
should find that specific jurisdiction over Respondent was proper since
his conduct fell within the purview of the Marshall long-arm statute and
satisfied all three specific jurisdiction elements. Both the law and notions of fundamental justice require Respondent to answer for his conduct in the state of Marshall, where the consequences of his activities
were most severely felt. Therefore, this Court should affirm the conclusion of the Circuit Court that personal jurisdiction properly lies in the
State of Marshall.
1.

Respondent purposefully availed himself of the benefits of the State
of Marshall

a)

Specific jurisdiction is appropriatebecause Respondent
purposefully availed himself of the benefits of conducting
business in the State of Marshall under a traditional
purposeful availment analysis

Purposeful availment is satisfied when the defendant purposefully
and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he should
expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court's
jurisdiction based on his contacts with the forum. See U.S. v. Swiss Am.
Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623 (1st Cir. 2001). Respondent purposefully availed
himself of the benefits of conducting business in the State of Marshall
when he sent Tekhead a deceptively labeled, unsolicited, promotional email message. This message attempted to attract Tekhead to Respondent's commercial Web site via hyperlink. Additionally, Respondent pilfered private data from Tekhead's workplace computer. These activities
directly resulted in Tekhead's termination from Distress. (R. at 6-7.)
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Respondent's contacts with the state of Marshall yielded valuable
commercial benefits. By indiscriminately directing his unwanted e-mail
message to a business in this state, Respondent was afforded the opportunity to advertise his commercial venture to the residents of this state,
including Tekhead. Further, by utilizing computer software to essentially steal the contents of Tekhead's e-mail address book, Respondent
was provided with contacts that would help allow him to continue his
barrage of unsolicited promotional e-mail messages. (R. at 7.) Respondent, who willingly engaged in reckless conduct in the State of Marshall,
should have expected to be haled into court there for any consequences
stemming from his conduct.
Respondent may argue that purposeful availment cannot be established because the transmission of a single unsolicited promotional email message into the forum state cannot satisfy the "conducting business" prong of Marshall's long-arm statute. See 735 MRC 25-302. However, Respondent's argument is unpersuasive because at least one
federal court has specifically held that a single promotional e-mail message is sufficient to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. See
Internet Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776 (S.D. Miss.
2001) (holding that an e-mail message sent to "a recipient or recipients"
that attempted to solicit business in the forum state satisfied the "doing
business" prong of the Mississippi long-arm statute) (emphasis added).
Other courts are moving in that direction as well. See Graduate Mgmt.
Admissions Council v. Raju, 241 F. Supp. 2d 589, 593 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(noting that "[I]t is well established that soliciting business through a
Web site accessible by Virginians satisfies the remaining requirement of
the long-arm statute, namely that the person 'does or solicits business' in
Virginia."); see also Reliance Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Pinnacle Cas. Assurance
Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1333 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (holding that "[elmails, like letters and phone calls, can constitute minimum contacts, at
least if the defendant or his agents send the message for pecuniary gain
rather than substantially personal purposes"). Clearly, Respondent's
transmission of the June 13 e-mail was for pecuniary gain because it was
an attempt to solicit business for his commercial online joke service. (R.
at 6-7.) Therefore, the State of Marshall must recognize the trend in the
federal courts towards holding e-mail tortfeasors responsible for their
conduct online.
b)

Should the court determine that respondent's conduct did not
amount to purposeful availment under the traditionalanalysis,
the court must recognize that purposeful availment exists
through application of the Calder effects test

Specific jurisdiction exists over respondent because he purposefully
availed himself of the benefits of the State of Marshall under the "effects
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test" articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Calder. See
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) holding that California could
exercise jurisdiction over individual libel defendants based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California). Although Calder involved a
libel claim, courts have expanded the application of the effects test to
other intentional torts. See IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259261 (3rd Cir. 1998) (noting that courts must consider Calder in intentional tort cases); see also Janmark Inc., v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 12011203 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying effects test to tort of interference with prospective economic advantage); see also Far W. Capital Inc., v. Towne, 46
F.3d 1071, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts have applied the
effects test to business torts).
Defamation is arguably the cause of action most suited for the effects test because defamation cannot exist unless the defamatory material is perceived by someone (other than the plaintiff). Dennis T. Rice &
Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the Effects Test in Determining Personal Jurisdictionin Cyberspace, 58 Bus. LAw 601, 613-614 (2003). Also,
as a matter of practicality, it is easier for a court to find the greatest
impact of defamation where the plaintiff is best known, that is, where the
plaintiff lives and works. Id. Similarly, the effects of false light invasion
of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion are felt most severely where the
plaintiff is located. As such, the effects test is appropriate for application
in the case at bar.
The effects test requires that the defendant allegedly have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3)
causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the
forum state. E.g. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat., Inc., 223 F.3d
1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Calder, 465 U.S at 788-789). Respondent's conduct easily satisfies all three elements, and demonstrates that
purposeful availment has occurred.
Respondent's conduct satisfied the first requirement of the effects
test because he committed an intentional act when he sent an unsolicited
promotional e-mail message to Tekhead in the State of Marshall. (R. at
7.) The facts clearly indicate that respondent "compiles these [e-mail]
addresses and then sends unsolicited e-mail messages to them." (R. at 7)
(emphasis added). Any argument by respondent that he did not intend
the harm is unavailing because "[i]t does not matter . . . that the injury
was not intended. The only relevant consideration is whether the wrongful acts were committed intentionally, and not negligently." Ford Motor
Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 628, 632 (E.D. Mich.
2001). The facts leave absolutely no doubt that Respondent intentionally
transmitted the June 13 e-mail to Tekhead. (R. at 6.)
Respondent's conduct also satisfies the second element of the effects
test, the "express aiming" requirement. Respondent knew that Distress
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was located in the State of Marshall, as the facts indicate that he had
submitted his resume there after graduating from college. (R. at 6.) The
facts also indicate that Respondent's spiders collected e-mail addresses
from Distress' Web site. (R. at 7.) A reasonable inference may also be
drawn that Distress' corporate e-mail addresses include the name of the
company. For example, it is well within the realm of reasonable inferences that Tekhead's Distress corporate e-mail address is
Atekhead@Distress.com. Finally, the nature of the audio portion of Respondent's e-mail message indicates that it was created to embarrass the
recipient at work in front of fellow employees by giving the recipient's
fellow employees the impression that the recipient is watching pornography on his workplace computer. (See R. at 7.)
When combined, these facts indicate that Respondent knew or
should have known that the unsolicited promotional e-mail message sent
to Tekhead would be received in the State of Marshall and specifically,
by Tekhead at his place of employment. In other words, Respondent
knew that he was sending the June 13 e-mail into the State of Marshall
because he knew Distress was located there. (R. at 6.) Such knowledge
on Respondent's part satisfies the "express aiming" requirement necessary to satisfy the second element of the effects test. See Bancroft, 223
F.3d at 1087 (noting that the "express aiming" requirement satisfied
when the defendant alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct
targeted plaintiff whom defendant knows to be resident of forum state).
To satisfy the third element of the effects test, the plaintiff must
establish that the defendant's conduct caused harm, the brunt of which
was suffered, and the defendant knew was likely to be suffered, in the
forum state. See Calder 465 U.S. at 789-790 (1984). As discussed in
great detail above, there is no question that the harm suffered by
Tekhead occurred in the State of Marshall. (R. at 5.) Most significantly,
Respondent was terminated from Distress in this state. (R. at 5.)
In Bancroft & Masters, the ninth circuit recently illustrated the application of the third prong of the Calder effects test. In that case, the
plaintiff California corporation which owned the Internet domain name
"masters.com," brought an action against Augusta National golf club
("ANI"), which held the "Masters" trademark, seeking declaratory judgment of non-dilution and non-infringement of mark, and cancellation of
golf club's mark due to misuse. Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1084.
Plaintiff argued that defendant purposefully availed itself in California
by sending a letter to Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), a Virginia company that registered the Web site for Bancroft & Masters ("B&M"), demanding that B & M cease and desist all use of the name "masters.com."
Id. The letter triggered B & M's dispute resolution policy, which left
plaintiff with no choice but to obtain a declaratory judgment establishing
its right to use the "masters.com" domain name. Id.
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In reversing the district court's dismissal of B & M's claim for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the ninth circuit held that defendant ANI purposefully availed itself in California by "act[ing] intentionally when it sent its
letter to NSI [in Virginia]. The letter was expressly aimed at California
because it individually targeted B & M, a California corporation doing
business almost exclusively in California. Finally, the effects of the letter were primarily felt, as ANI knew they would be, in California." Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088. In the instant case the effects of the
June 13 e-mail sent by Respondent were felt primarily in the State of
Marshall, just as the effects of ANI's demand letter sent to NSI in Virginia were felt in California. Id. As such, this court should follow the
analysis applied by the ninth circuit in Bancroft & Masters and find that
the third element of the Calder effects test is satisfied by Respondent's
conduct.
2.

Specific jurisdiction is appropriatebecause Tekhead's cause of
action arose out of Respondent's activities in the state of
Marshall

Respondent's conduct satisfied the second element of the specific jurisdiction calculus because, but for Respondent's transmission of the unsolicited promotional e-mail message to Tekhead, no allegations of false
light invasion of privacy or intrusion upon seclusion would have been
raised. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. at 1088 (noting "[tihe second requirement for specific jurisdiction is that the contacts constituting purposeful availment must be the ones that give rise to the current suit. We
measure this requirement in terms of 'but for' causation"). Tekhead's
claims are plainly derived from the e-mail sent by Respondent. (R. at 910.)
Further, several jurisdictions have held that in cases where an intentional tort is committed, the tort occurs where the injury occurs.
Janmark,Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 783-787 (1984) ("There can be no serious doubt
after Calderthat the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury
may entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor.")); see also Phillip
Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 233 (Md. 2000) (holding that a
tort occurs where the injury occurs).
In the instant case, Tekhead was terminated by Distress in the
State of Marshall as a direct result of being portrayed in a false light by
Respondent's e-mail message. (R. at 7-8.) Additionally, Respondent's email message, directed to Tekhead at Distress, accessed and retrieved
information from Tekhead's workplace computer without authorization.
This act of deceptively misappropriating information serves as the basis
for Tekhead's intrusion upon seclusion cause of action. (R. at 7-8.) The
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injuries caused by Respondent's conduct clearly occurred in and arose
out of Respondent's contacts with the State of Marshall. As such, specific
jurisdiction is properly lies in this state.
3.

Specific jurisdictionover Respondent is reasonable because the
exercise of such jurisdictioncomports with notions of fairplay
and substantialjustice required by the Constitution

An inference arises that the third factor of the specific jurisdiction
analysis is satisfied if the first two requirements are met. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting
that, "if we find, as we do, the first two elements of a prima facie casepurposeful availment and a cause of action arising from the defendant's
contacts with the forum state-then an inference arises that this third
factor is also present"). However, assuming that no such inference exists, specific jurisdiction is nevertheless reasonable.
For jurisdiction to be reasonable, it must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burger King Corp v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). Burger King explicitly places upon
the defendant the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness and requires the defendant to put on a "compelling case." Id. at 476-477. The
reasonableness determination requires the consideration of several specific factors: (1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into
the forum state, (2) the burden on the defendant in defending in the forum, (3) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's
state, (4) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (5) the
most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy, (6) the importance of
the forum to the plaintiffs interest in convenient and effective relief, and
(7) the existence of an alternative forum. Id. An analysis of the aforementioned factors makes it clear that the exercise specific jurisdiction
over Respondent is constitutionally reasonable.
The first requirement, the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state, clearly weighs in favor of Tekhead. As discussed above, it was Respondent's intentional acts that serve as the basis
for Tekhead's false light invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion
claims. Further, because "modern transportation and communications
have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in
a state where he engages in economic activity," it usually will not be unfair to subject him to the burdens of litigating in another forum for disputes relating to such activity. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957). The facts indicate that Respondent grew up in Johnstonville,
Marshall, where his parents still reside. (R. at 6.) Since Potter is a
neighboring state of Marshall, Respondent would not be required to
travel cross country to defend here. (R. at 6.) Finally, modern means of
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communication allow Respondent to litigate in Marshall while remaining at his home in Potter for the majority of the time spent in litigation.
See Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 252, 259 (11th Cir.
1996).
For the fourth requirement, a State generally has a "manifest interest" in providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.
This interest is not outweighed by Respondent's inconvenience. Id. at
462. Furthermore, no conclusion can be drawn that the State of Marshall does not have a legitimate interest in holding an extraterritorial
tortfeasor answerable on a claim related to the contacts he has established in this state. See Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776
(1984). Finally, Tekhead obviously has a strong interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief in his home forum. See Beverly Hills Fan
Club v. Royal Sovereign Corp, 21 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Since the exercise of specific jurisdiction is plainly warranted by the
events related to Respondent's transmission of the June 13 e-mail, this
court must affirm the circuit court's determination that the exercise of
personal jurisdiction over Respondent was proper.
II. RESPONDENT COMMITTED FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF
PRIVACY WHEN HE SENT AN UNSOLICITED PROMOTIONAL EMAIL MESSAGE TO TEKHEAD THAT MADE IT APPEAR TO
TEKHEAD'S COLLEAGUES THAT HE VIEWED PORNOGRAPHY
ON HIS WORKPLACE COMPUTER
The State of Marshall affirmatively recognizes a cause of action for
false light invasion of privacy, and has consistently followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts when adjudicating such claims. (R. at 9.) The
Restatement provides:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the
other before the public in a false light is subject to the other for invasion
of privacy if,
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other
would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). The heart of this tort
lies in the publicity. See Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of
Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987, 989 (111.1989). The Restatement explains
that, "a matter is made public by communicating it to the public at large,
or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially
one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt.
a.
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Generally understood, a false light invasion of privacy action differs
from a defamation action in that the injury in privacy actions is mental
distress from having been exposed to public view, while the injury in defamation actions is damage to reputation. See Rinsley v. Brandt, 700
F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir. 1983). The element of publicity in a false light
claim differs from the element of publication in other defamation claims.
See Ali v. Douglass Cable Communications, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1383 (D.
Kan. 1996). The latter means any communication by the defendant to a
third party; the former concerns communications made to the public at
large or to so many persons that the matter will certainly become public
knowledge. Id.
The standard of review for a motion for summary judgment is de
novo. U.S. v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). On summary judgment,
inferences to be drawn from underlying facts contained in materials
presented must be viewed in light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion, Tekhead. See id. In the instant case, summary adjudication
was inappropriate because genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether Respondent placed Tekhead in a false light before the public.
A.

By CREATING THE FALSE IMPRESSION IN THE EYES OF TEKHEAD'S

COLLEAGUES THAT TEKHEAD VIEWED PORNOGRAPHY ON His WORKPLACE

COMPUTER, RESPONDENT PLACED TEKHEAD IN A FALSE LIGHT BEFORE
THE PUBLIC UNDER THE RESTATEMENT STANDARD FOR PUBLICITY

Genuine issues of material fact remain at issue as to whether the unsolicited promotional e-mail message sent by Respondent caused Tekhead
to be placed in a false light before the public when "at least of five" of his
coworkers along with his supervisor were given the false impression that
Tekhead views pornography on his workplace computer. (R. at 5.) By
sending an unsolicited promotional e-mail to Tekhead that created such
an impression, Respondent placed Tekhead in a false light before the
public, "or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D (1977). Therefore, the grant of summary judgment by the circuit
court was inappropriate, and this Court should remand for further adjudication of the unresolved issues.
Genuine issues of material fact have not be resolved due to the fact
that discovery has not been completed. (R. at 9.) For example, when
Respondent's e-mail message took control of Tekhead's computer and
broadcast the offensive sounds and images, "at least 5 co-workers" and
his supervisor converged around his workstation. (R at.5) (emphasis added). A reasonable inference may easily be drawn that as a result of this
relatively small publication, Tekhead will become falsely known as someone who views pornography at his office computer among the entire Dis-
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tress Corporation and possibly even the entire computer software
industry in the State of Marshall. Additionally, if just one of Tekhead's
coworkers that witnessed the offensive display on Tekhead's computer
were to tell one other person, the matter could very easily be broadcast to
so many persons that the matter would eventually become "substantially
one of public knowledge." See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 652D
(1977). Therefore, without the completion of discovery, it is premature to
dispose of Tekhead's claim for false light invasion of privacy on summary
judgment grounds. See Grossman v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 131 F.
Supp. 2d 299, 312 (D. Conn. 2000); Krochalis v. Ins. Co. of N. America,
629 F. Supp. 1360, 1371 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Further, courts have recognized that a false light invasion of privacy that occurs in the workplace
before a small number of employees may be sufficient to satisfy the publicity requirement. For example in Santiesteban, the fifth circuit held
that a country club employee who had his newly bought tires wrongly
repossessed when stripped from his vehicle in front of several coworkers
was held to have met the publicity requirement. Santiesteban v. Good
Year Tire and Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 10 (5th Cir. 1962). Significantly,
the court took into account the "embarrassment, humiliation, and
wounded feelings" entailing two sleepless nights caused by the defendant's unreasonable conduct. Id. The court, in considering the appropriate amount of damages to be awarded plaintiff, reasoned
In some torts the entire injury is to the peace, happiness or feelings of
the plaintiff; in such cases no measure of damages can be prescribed,
except the enlightened conscience of impartial jurors. The worldly circumstances of the parties, the amount of bad faith in the transaction,
and all the attendant facts should be weighed.
Id. at 11-12 (citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga.
App. 662 (1936)) (emphasis added).
Similarly, the injury suffered by Tekhead as a result of Respondent's
transmission of the offensive e-mail program constituted an injury to his
peace, happiness, and feelings. This Court should follow the fifth circuit
and take into consideration that, "all attendant facts should be weighed."
Id. at 12. The Court should consider the fact that Respondent's e-mail
message was deceptively labeled so as to preclude the recipient from deleting it before it was opened. (R. at 4.) The Court should also consider
the fact that Respondent's e-mail message was nothing more than tasteless promotional device soliciting business for Respondent's commercial
online joke service. (R. at 6.) This Court must take into account the deceptive and irresponsible nature of Respondent's conduct and apply the
expanded definition of publicity utilized by the fifth circuit in
Santiesteban.
Regardless of the definition utilized, however, genuine issues of material fact remain unresolved as to whether the portrayal of Tekhead as
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one who views pornography on his workplace computer before "at least
five" of his coworkers and his supervisor satisfies the publicity requirement. Therefore, summary judgment is not warranted at this juncture of
the proceedings, and Tekhead is entitled to his day in court.
B.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SHOULD THE COURT DETERMINE THAT THE

RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT A FINDING THAT TEKHEAD WAS PLACED IN A
FALSE LIGHT BEFORE THE PUBLIC UNDER THE RESTATEMENT STANDARD,
JUSTICE REQUIRES THAT THIS COURT FIND THAT THE PUBLICITY
REQUIREMENT WAS SATISFIED UNDER THE SPECIAL

RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION

The state of Marshall should adopt the special relationship exception to the publicity requirement in false light cases to close the loophole
that allows false light defendants to escape liability for placing someone
in a false light before those whom the plaintiff has a relationship. The
impression left in the minds of Tekhead's professional colleagues, those
with whom he interacts with on a daily basis, has much more of an impact than the same impression would have had if given to an anonymous
"public at large." The Illinois Court of Appeals has addressed this specific problem and held that, the special relationship exception to the publicity requirement for false light invasion of privacy provides that the
"element of [publicity] in an action for false light may be satisfied by
establishing that false and highly offensive information was disclosed to
a person or persons with whom a plaintiff has a special relationship."
Poulos v. Lutheran Soc. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 728 N.E.2d 547, 555-556 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2000). Such an'exception is based on the premise that a disclosure of false information to a limited number of persons may be just as
devastating to a plaintiff as a disclosure to the general public since the
plaintiff may have a special relationship with the particular public to
whom the information is disclosed. See id. at 555; see Kurczaba v. Pollock, 742 N.E.2d 425, 435 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
In Poulos, the false light shed on plaintiff foster parent was a false
accusation of child molestation by his former foster child. 728 N.E.2d at
552. Defendant social worker, knowing that the allegations were potentially unfounded, called the chairman of the board of trustees of the
school where plaintiff was employed as a teacher. Id. After plaintiff was
terminated, the accuser recanted his allegations. Id. Defendant argued
that a false light invasion of privacy claim could not be sustained since
her phone call did not place plaintiff in a false light before the public, as
required by the Restatement. Id. at 555. The Illinois Court of Appeals
rejected defendant's lack of publicity argument and pointed out that,
"the adoption of such an exception is both justified and appropriate in
that a disclosure to a limited number of persons may be just as devastat-
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ing to a plaintiff as a disclosure to the general public." Id. at 555. Absent the special exception utilized by the court in Poulos, plaintiff would
have had no recourse against the defendant whose actions led to his
termination.
Likewise, the false light created by Respondent in the case at bar,
although only before a minimum of five of Tekhead's coworkers and his
supervisor, had a similarly devastating effect in that it resulted in
Tekhead's termination. (R. at 5.) A requirement that the false light publication be made to the public at large would leave Tekhead with no recourse for the blameworthy and indiscriminate acts of Respondent. An
invasion of plaintiffs right to privacy is important if it exposes private
facts to a public whose knowledge of those facts would be embarrassing
to the plaintiff. See Kurczaba, 742 N.E.2d at 435 (citing Beaumon v.
Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531-532 (Mich. 1977)). Such a public might be a
general public, if the person were a public figure, or a particularpublic
such as fellow employees, if the person were not a public figure. See id.
(emphasis added). Obviously, being portrayed as one who views pornography on his workplace computer before can have devastating effects, as
experienced by Tekhead in the instant case. Therefore, this Court must
recognize that a fair and just outcome can only be preserved by adoption
of the special relationship exception. As such, this Court must remand
and instruct the circuit court to apply the special relationship exception.
III. RESPONDENT'S TRANSMISSION OF AN UNSOLICITED
PROMOTIONAL E-MAIL MESSAGE THAT SURREPTITIOUSLY
LOCATES AND TRANSMITS TO RESPONDENT THE CONTENTS
OF TEKHEAD'S E-MAIL ADDRESS BOOK CONSTITUTES AN
INVASION OF PRIVACY BY INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION
According to the Restatement, as followed by the State of Marshall,
an actionable intrusion claim may be premised on an intrusion, physical
or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b
(1977). An intrusion may also occur by the use of one's senses, with or
without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiffs private
affairs, as by tapping his telephone wires. Med. Lab. Mgmt. v. Am.
Broad. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. b (1977)). To prevail on an intrusion claim, a plaintiff must show that the defendant penetrated some
zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding him. See Shulman v.
Group W. Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998). An intrusion may
also occur by some other form of investigation into the plaintiffs private
concerns, as by opening his private and personal mail, searching his safe
or wallet, or examining his private bank account. See Med. Lab. Mgmt.,
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30 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. The tort of intrusion upon seclusion is based
upon the manner in which an individual obtains the information. See Ali
v. Douglas Cable, 929 F. Supp. 1362, 1382 (D. Kan. 1996) (citing Werner
v. Kliewer, 710 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Kan. 1985)). A legitimate expectation of
privacy is the touchstone of intrusion upon seclusion. Fletcher v. Price
Chopper Foods of Trumann, Inc., 220 F.3d 871, 877 (8th Cir. 2000).
A motion for summary judgment will be denied unless the evidence
on record demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact
presented by Tekhead and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See MARSHALL R. Civ. P. 56(c). The requirement is
that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986). Summary judgment will not lie if
the dispute about a material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See id. at 248. Further, the record evidence must be construed in
the light most favorable to, and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of, the nonmoving party. Id. Therefore, the evidence of Tekhead is
to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
See id. at 265.
There is no direct authority addressing the specific question
presented here, that is, whether the transmission of an e-mail message
with an attached program that surreptitiously locates and transmits to
the sender the contents of one's e-mail address book amounts to an actionable intrusion upon seclusion. Nonetheless, substantial authority
addressing similar privacy invasions suggests that several genuine issues of material fact are at issue as to whether Respondent pried into a
private matter of Tekhead. Therefore, summary judgment is not warranted at this stage in the proceedings, and this Court must remand to
the circuit court for further adjudication of the disputed facts.
A.

By USING A COMPUTER PROGRAM ATTACHED TO A DECEPTIVELY
LABELED E-MAIL MESSAGE THAT SURREPTIOUSLY LOCATED AND

TRANSMITTED TO RESPONDENT THE CONTENTS OF TEKHEAD'S E-MAIL
ADDRESS BOOK, RESPONDENT INTRUDED UPON TEKHEAD'S SECLUSION BY
UNREASONABLY PRYING INTO His PRIVATE AFFAIRS

Respondent's unsolicited promotional e-mail message intruded into
a private matter of Tekhead when the attached computer program surreptitiously accessed his e-mail address book and transmitted to Respondent the private contents therein. (R. at 7.) Essentially, Respondent
deployed an electronic thief to infiltrate Tekhead's computer for the purposes of copying and stealing data that did not belong to him. The
Southern District of New York held that a theoretically similar intrusion
was actionable in Socialist Workers Party. In that case, the F.B.I. uti-
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lized informants who infiltrated private meetings conducted by the Socialist Party to overhear and report upon private discussions and
conversations and to read, copy and steal private documents. Socialist
Workers Party v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 463 F. Supp. 515, 524 (S.D.N.Y.,
1978).
Although Respondent did not deploy a person to appropriate the
data from Tekhead's computer in the instant case, the reasoning of Socialist Workers Party remains applicable. A private matter, Tekhead's email address book, was accessed and the contents were copied and stolen. (R. at 7.) Respondent, like the F.B.I. in Socialist Workers Party,
utilized an informant to carry out the same type of mission, the only difference being that the informant in the instant case took the form of a
computer program. (R. at 7.) Warren and Brandeis warned of this precise type of intrusion in their seminal law review article, The Right to
Privacy: "Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing to the individual . . . the right to be let alone . . . Numerous
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.'" Samuel D. Warren & Lewis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890). At a minimum, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether an actionable intrusion or prying occurred.
Respondent may argue that an intrusion upon seclusion cause of action cannot be sustained because he did not commit a physical intrusion
or prying. Such equivocation is not persuasive, especially in light of the
deceptive nature of his conduct. Furthermore, the law is rapidly responding to advances in technology brought about by the Internet age.
For example, in Thrifty-Tel, Inc., v. Bezenek, the California Court of Appeal held that computer-generated signals used to access a telephone
system were sufficiently tangible to support the rarely applied trespass
to chattels 2 cause of action against the defendant computer hacker. See
Thrifty-Tel, Inc., v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1567 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996). A trespass to chattel requires a physical trespass to physical
property. See Laura Quilter, The Continuing Expansion of Cyberspace
Trespass to Chattels, BERKELEY TECH. L.J., 421, 424-425 (2002).
In their decision, the Court in Thrifty-Tel expanded traditional common law definitions so that the law could keep pace with technology. See
id. Likewise, this Court should apply an expansive definition of "intrusion" or "prying" to incorporate the use of an e-mailed program to cause
an unauthorized appropriation of information stored on another's com2. A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally dispossessing another of
the chattel, or using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

217 (1965).
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puter. An expanded definition is necessary for the dual purposes of
keeping pace with technological advances and holding Respondent accountable for his deceptive conduct.
B.

RESPONDENT INTRUDED UPON A PRIVATE MATTER OF TEKHEAD

By

DECEPTIVELY GAINING UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO HIS E-MAIL ADDRESS
BOOK ON

1.

His

WORKPLACE COMPUTER

Tekhead possessed a reasonableexpectation of privacy with regards
to his workplace computer and e-mail address book

By sending an e-mail message that surreptitiously accessed and
transmitted the contents of Respondent's workplace e-mail address book,
Respondent intruded into a private matter of Tekhead because Tekhead
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy therein. In the interests of
judicial efficiency, this Court should look to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to determine whether Tekhead possessed a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the instant case. The Fourth Amendment analysis for determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists embraces
two questions: (1) whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited
an actual expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the individual's expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000). Application of this analysis
to the instant case proves that Tekhead possessed both a subjective and
objective expectation of privacy in his workplace computer and e-mail
address book.
a)

Tekhead possessed a subjective expectation of privacy with regards
to his workplace computer and e-mail address book

Respondent intruded upon a private matter when his unsolicited
promotional e-mail message surreptitiously located and transmitted the
contents of Tekhead's e-mail address book because Tekhead had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy therein. The plaintiff in an invasion of privacy case must conduct himself in a manner consistent with an
"actual expectation of privacy." See Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994). Further, he must not have manifested by his conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive actions of defendant. See id. Tekhead's conduct in the instant case demonstrates a
subjective expectation of privacy.
Respondent may argue that Tekhead possessed no subjective expectation of privacy in his workplace computer and e-mail address book because he signed the Distress Electronic Information Systems Policy
(hereinafter "EISP"), which makes it clear that employees should not expect privacy in using the Company's computers. (See Exhibit A-1,
3.)
However, Respondent's argument is without merit because the EISP

332

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

specifically delineates those to whom Tekhead's expectation of privacy is
surrendered. (See Exhibit A-i, 2) ("[t]he contents of all... information
on the systems, including e-mail, are subject to review and use by authorized Company representativesand by thirdparties (includinglaw enforcement officials) as the Company, in its discretion, deems necessary or
appropriate.")(emphasis added). The record clearly indicates that the
EISP contains no language that would lead Tekhead to believe that his
expectation of privacy was in any way diminished as to unauthorized
third parties. (See Exhibit A-i, 2.) The fact that Tekhead surrendered
an expectation of privacy to his employer is not dispositive as to his expectation of privacy with Respondent. Therefore, Tekhead's subjective
expectation of privacy remains intact. By signing the EISP, Tekhead did
not manifest by his conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive actions of
Respondent. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 648.
Since discovery has not been completed, several questions involving
issues of material fact regarding Tekhead's subjective expectation of privacy are unresolved by the record as it stands. (R. at 10.) Reasonable
inferences can be made to suggest that Tekhead expected the information in his e-mail address book to remain private. As the party opposing
summary judgment, all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
Tekhead's favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 264
(1986).
The facts suggest that Tekhead may have used a password to protect
the information on his computer and his e-mail address book. (See Exhibit A-i,
3.) The EISP suggests that the use of passwords to protect
information on computers by employees at Distress was a common practice. (See Exhibit A-i,
3.) Therefore, a reasonable inference can be
drawn that Tekhead utilized a password to prevent unauthorized access
to his computer. By using a password, Tekhead would obviously have
been conducting himself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 648. Further, the simple fact that
Tekhead stored information in his e-mail address book, as opposed to
entering the information in a traditional address book, suggests that he
wanted to keep it secluded, away from the prying eyes of passerby.
Again, a reasonable inference can be drawn that such conduct demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy. Since several genuine issues
of material fact remain at issue as to whether Tekhead possessed a subjective expectation of privacy with regards to his workplace computer
and e-mail address book, summary adjudication is obviously premature
at this juncture of the proceedings. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 265. As
such, this Court should remand to the circuit court for resolution of all
unresolved factual disputes.
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Tekhead possessed an objective expectation of privacy with regards
to his computer and e-mail address book

Respondent intruded upon a private matter when his unsolicited promotional e-mail surreptiously located and transmitted the contents of
Tekhead's e-mail address book because Tekhead had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy therein. There can be no intrusion upon
seclusion absent an invasion into a matter with which the plaintiff possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. v. Am.
Broad. Co., 306 F.3d 806, 814 (D. Ariz. 1998) (noting that an objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy is required by a plaintiff in an intrusion upon seclusion cause of action). An objective expectation of privacy
is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See Katz v.
U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Clearly, Tekhead's expectation that the
contents of his workplace computer was a private matter as to unauthorized third party computer hackers was one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable.
Respondent will undoubtedly argue that Tekhead possessed no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy as to his workplace computer,
because the vast majority of cases considering this issue have held that
such an expectation of privacy does not exist. See Immgr. and Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 213 (1984). However, such an argument is unavailing because the issue presented here should be
whether Tekhead possessed an objective expectation of privacy in his
workplace computer and e-mail address book as to unauthorized third
parties, such as Respondent. By accurately framing the issue, Tekhead
clearly possessed an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy as to
any information appropriated from his workplace computer by an unauthorized third party.
Tekhead's expectation of privacy in the contents of his e-mail address book is reasonable because such an expectation is one that society
is undoubtedly prepared to recognize as such, especially in light of what
Tekhead may have had stored on his computer. The record is not clear
as to exactly what "contents" were accessible to Respondent. (See R. at
7.) A Microsoft Outlook address book, like the one used by Tekhead, is
capable of storing much more than just e-mail addresses. See PETER AiTKEN, et al., MICROSOFT OFFICE 2000 SMALL BUSINESS EDITION 6-IN-1 372378 (Lisa Gebken & San Dee Phillips, eds., Que Books 2001) (1997).
Along with e-mail addresses, Tekhead's address book could have contained home, business, and fax numbers, job titles, and home addresses
for every person who he entered as a contact. 3 Id. at 372-373. Additionally, more private information could have been stored in Tekhead's ad3. In Microsoft Outlook, a "contact" is any person or company for which the user enters a name, address, phone number, or other information. See PETER AITKEN, et al.,
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dress book, such as the names of a contact's spouse and children, and
their anniversaries and birthdays. Id. The record indicates that
Tekhead did store several personal contacts in his e-mail address book.
(R. at 8.) Once again, as the party opposing summary judgment, all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in Tekhead's favor. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 264 (1986). Assuming Tekhead utilized all
of the features of his e-mail address book, the "contents" referred to in
the record become much more valuable to him, increasing his expectation that they remain private. (R. at 7.) Therefore, this Court must remand to the circuit court for a determination as to whether Tekhead's
expectation of privacy in his workplace computer was an expectation
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Reasonable inferences may easily be drawn that Tekhead stored private, personal information in his e-mail address box. (R. at 8.) Such inferences must be
presented to a jury.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must affirm the circuit court's
determination that personal jurisdiction properly lies over Respondent
in the State of Marshall. Further, this Court must reverse the circuit
courts grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent as to
Tekhead's false light invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion
causes of action, as genuine issues of material fact have not been
resolved.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT
HAS PROPER JURISDICTION OVER

II.

DospAM?

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER THE AUDIO AND VIDEO
DISPLAY ON TEKHEAD'S COMPUTER CONSTITUTE FALSE LIGHT?

III.

DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER THE DISPLAY OF
NUDE IMAGES AND THE UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS OF THE MICROSOFT
OUTLOOK ADDRESS BOOK CONSTITUTED INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION?
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BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MARSHALL:

Respondent/Cross-Petitioner, Allan Dospam ("Dospam"), Appellee in
Cause No. 02-CV-6245 before the First District Court of Appeals for the
State of Marshall respectfully submits this brief in response to the brief
filed by the Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, Alexander Tekhead
("Tekhead"), and requests this honorable Court reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals holding that the trial court properly asserted jurisdiction over Dospam, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals
holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of Dospam with respect to Tekhead's claims of publicity placing a person
in a false light and intrusion upon seclusion.
OPINION BELOW
The Farbrook County Circuit Court denied Dospam's motion for summary judgment as to the issue of personal jurisdiction and granted the
motion as to the issues of false light and intrusion upon seclusion. The
First District Court of Appeals of the State of Marshall affirmed the circuit court's order denying in part and granting in part Dospam's motion
for summary judgment as shown in the record.
CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND
RESTATEMENT PROVISIONS
The constitutional, statutory, and Restatement provisions relevant to
the determination of this case include the following: the Due Process
Clause of the United States Constitution provided in Appendix A; MARSHALL REVISED CODE,

chapter 735, section 25-302 provided in Appendix

B; and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section 652B and 652E provided in Appendices C and D, respectively.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Dospam is a resident and citizen of the State of Potter. (R. at 6.)
After graduating from college in June, 1996, he accepted a position with
a software development company in the State of Potter. (R. at 6.) Since
2001, he has operated a Web site called Webgags.com. (R. at 6.) The
domain name "webgags.com" is registered with a domain name registrar
located in the Cayman Islands. (R. at 6.) The domain name is registered
to Webgags Corporation, George Town, Grand Cayman. (R. at 6.) Web
hosting and e-mail service for the Web site is provided by a Web hosting
service located in Monaco. (R. at 6.)
Webgags.com is a commercial online joke service that offers its customers the service of allowing them to play digital practical jokes on
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other Internet users. (R. at 6.) To accomplish this, Webgags.com offers a
selection of jokes that can be sent to others through e-mail. (R. at 6.)
These jokes include making a computer screen appear as if files are being deleted, playing noises, and playing distracting songs. (R. at 6.)
In order to promote Webgags, Dospam utilizes "spiders", e-mail marketing software, which search Web sites for e-mail addresses. (R. at 7.)
The spiders randomly extract e-mail addresses from the Web sites and
return them to Dospam so that he can send out a promotional e-mail
message to each of the addresses. (R. at 7.) Dospam's spiders collected email addresses from a Web site of Distress Technologies, Inc. ("Distress"), which listed all of its employees and their e-mail addresses. (R.
at 7.) Included in the list of e-mail addresses that the spiders extracted
from Distress' Web site was that of Alexander Tekhead. (R. at 7.)
Alexander Tekhead was hired by Distress on June 20, 2000. (R. at
3.) Upon being hired Tekhead read and signed the Distress Employee
Handbook ("Handbook"). (See R. at 3.) Included in the Handbook were
the established guidelines for employee computer use. (R. at 3.) By signing the guidelines, Tekhead agreed that he would not use Distress' computers for personal use, and that Distress reserved the right to monitor
and disclose information stored in his computer. (R. at Ex. A-1.) Further, Tekhead acknowledged that he understood that his use of passwords and access codes does not confer or imply privacy rights. (R. at Ex.
A-1.)
At his first performance review on December 6, 2000, Tekhead was
described as having "a lack of enthusiasm, an apparent desire to distract
other employees, a jokester' attitude, and an unwillingness to meet demands when needed." (R. at 3.) At his second performance evaluation
on June 20, 2001, the review concluded that Tekhead's performance was
barely passable. (R. at 4.) Comments from his supervisors included a
lack of motivation and unprofessional behavior. (R. at 4.) One supervisor complained that he enjoyed practical jokes, and he had played quite a
few of them. (R. at Ex. B-1.)
On June 13, 2002, Tekhead received a promotional message from
Dospam. (R. at 7.) The message originated from Dospam and was
routed through a third-party relay server in Korea, which forwarded the
message on to Distress. (R. at 5.) The promotional e-mail that Dospam
sends out contains a practical joke which, when opened, (1) shows an
animated image of two cartoon characters dancing in the nude; (2) displays a hyperlink with the caption "Click here to send this or other delightful Webgags to a friend."; (3) increases the target computer's
speaker volume; (4) audibly announces "Alert! Stop viewing porn! Close
your browser immediately!"; (5) repeats the message; and (6) disallows
any keyboard control of the computer. (R. at 7.) The message also in-
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cludes a program that collects the contents of the target computer's
Microsoft Outlook address book and sends it back to Dospam. (R. at 7.)
Tekhead opened the e-mail and the joke ran on the computer as described above. (R. at 5.) As the audible message repeated itself, at least
five other Distress employees congregated at Tekhead's computer. (R. at
5.) Tekhead's supervisor thereafter dismissed Tekhead for the remainder of the day. (R. at 5.) The next day, Distress' general counsel telephoned Tekhead and informed him that he had been discharged. (R. at
5.) Soon after being fired, Tekhead filed a wrongful termination lawsuit
against Distress. (R at 5.) Tekhead later filed suit against Dospam after
discovery had commenced in the wrongful termination suit. (R. at 5.)
After receiving service of process for Tehead's suit against him, Dospam
published the contents of an Outlook address book he retrieved from a
Distress computer on his Webgags.com Web site. (R. at 7-8.)
II.

SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Tekhead sued Dospam in the Farbrook County Circuit Court ("trial
court") alleging causes of action of intrusion upon seclusion and publicity
placing a person in a false light. (R. at 1.) Dospam moved for summary
judgment against all claims brought against him by Tekhead, and additionally moved for summary judgment as to whether jurisdiction existed
over him. (R. at 8.) The trial court denied Dospam's motion as to jurisdiction, but granted his motion as to the claims of intrusion upon seclusion and publicity placing a person in a false light. (R. at 8.) The First
District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order denying in part
and granting in part Dospam's motion for summary judgment. (R. at
11.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.
On de novo review, this Court should reverse the decision of the First
District Court of Appeals which denied summary judgment to Dospam as
to personal jurisdiction and dismiss this action. Alternatively, this Court
should affirm the decision which granted summary judgment in favor of
Dospam on Tekhead's claims for false-light publicity and intrusion upon
seclusion. A summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Thus, when a reasonable juror could not return a verdict for the
nonmoving party, summary judgment is proper.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution requires that the defendant have sufficient minimum contacts
with the forum state in order to assert personal jurisdiction. In order to
satisfy this requirement when the cause of action does not arise out of or
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relate to the defendant's activities in the forum state, those activities
must be sufficiently continuous and systematic to make the assertion of
in personam jurisdiction reasonable. Specific jurisdiction can be asserted despite a lesser showing of contacts with the forum state, so long
as the defendant purposefully avails himself of the laws of the forum
state through his activities, and the litigation results from the alleged
injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. Regardless of
whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
state, the exercise of jurisdiction must also be reasonable.
The assertion of general jurisdiction is improper because Dospam
does not have continuous and systematic contacts with the State of Marshall. The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is high and requires that the defendant's contacts approximate physical presence. In
this case, the only current contact that Dospam has with the State of
Marshall is his operation of Webgags.com, which is accessible to anyone
around the world. This is not the type of continuous and systematic contact that satisfies this high standard. Dospam's previous contacts with
Marshall are irrelevant when determining whether general jurisdiction
is proper. The only relevant forum contacts are the contacts at the time
of the incident complained of. Dospam's relevant contacts ended six
years prior to the incident complained of. Therefore, these contacts with
the State of Marshall are not systematic and continuous.
Dospam's operation of his Web site is insufficient to assert personal
jurisdiction over him because the Web site does nothing more than make
information available to those who are interested in it. A majority of
courts agree that this type of Web site may not serve as the basis for
exercising personal jurisdiction. This is so because otherwise every complaint arising out of the Internet would automatically result in personal
jurisdiction wherever the plaintiff is located. Therefore, general jurisdiction is improper based on his Web site.
Further, specific jurisdiction is inappropriate because Dospam did
not purposefully avail himself of the laws of Marshall. If the Dospam's
conduct was insufficient to confer general jurisdiction, the court may
only exercise jurisdiction if: (1) he purposefully availed himself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Marshall, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim arose out of or resulted from
his forum-related activities; and (3) an exercise of jurisdiction would be
reasonable. Because the first and third requirements are not met here,
personal jurisdiction over Dospam is improper.
Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the laws of Marshall
because the June 13 e-mail was not sent for direct financial gain. In
order for the e-mail to have met the purposeful availment requirement,
the e-mail, at a minimum, must have been sent for pecuniary gain. Since
this e-mail was not sent for pecuniary gain, Dospam did not purposefully
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avail himself of the laws of Marshall and personal jurisdiction was improperly asserted.
Even if Dospam's e-mail was sent for pecuniary gain, the e-mail did
not have a "substantial connection" with the State of Marshall as required by the Due Process Clause. While a single contact can serve as
the exclusive basis for personal jurisdiction, that contact must have a
substantial connection with the forum state. The only connection that
this e-mail had with the State of Marshall was that it was opened there.
To hold that this satisfies the "substantial" requirement would render
the concept of "substantial" meaningless.
Further, Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the laws of
Marshall by posting Tekhead's e-mail address book on his Web site. Unlike a newspaper or magazine, Dospam did not have the option of bypassing certain forums. Dospam's Web site was available around the world,
and he did not specifically encourage residents of the State of Marshall
to visit it. Such contacts are insufficient to trigger personal jurisdiction.
Finally, jurisdiction over Dospam offends traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. A factor that must be considered in determining whether jurisdiction is reasonable is the burden on the defendant. The nature of the defendant's contacts with the forum must be
such that he should reasonably anticipate having to litigate in that jurisdiction. In this case there is no way that Dospam could have known that
Tekhead would open the e-mail in the State of Marshall, this was merely
a random act. However, even if he had known, the notion that he would
be subject to litigation in Marshall simply by sending out an e-mail was
beyond his reasonable expectations. Therefore, requiring Dospam to litigate in Marshall offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.
II.
Tekhead's claim against Dospam alleged publicity placing him in a
false light before the public. However, this claim fails as a matter of law
because the June 13 could not reasonably have been taken as factual,
and therefore, did not place him in a false light. The reasonable viewer
of the message would have concluded that the e-mail was a joke, and the
only impression the e-mail could have possibly communicated about
Tekhead was that he was a practical jokester. This impression is not a
false one. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to Dospam as to publicity placing a person in a false light.
Tekhead was not represented as being a pornographer through the
content of Dospam's e-mail message because the reasonable viewer of the
e-mail would have treated its contents as a joke. In addition to having
pictures of cartoon characters, the message made clear that it was a joke

348

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

by displaying a hyperlink, which manifested that it was a joke. If a
statement cannot reasonably be taken as factual, there is no false light
invasion of privacy because the public did not receive a false impression
about Tekhead. Therefore, the message does not amount to false light
because a false impression was not created about Tekhead.
The only impression that could have been created about Tekhead
through the contents of the June 13 e-mail was that he was a practical
jokester. However, an essential element of the false light element of this
tort is that the impression be a false one. Tekhead's performance review
comments from his supervisors evidence that Tekhead was indeed a
practical jokester. Therefore, because Tekhead was not placed in a false
light, summary judgment as to the false light publicity claim was proper.
Even if this Court should find that Tekhead was placed in a false
light, the appellate court correctly held that the element of publicity was
lacking. The Restatement's definition of "publicity" requires a communication to the public at large. Here, the message was only communicated
to a small group of Tekhead's co-workers. This court should adhere to
the rule requiring publicity to the public at large because it properly constrains the tort of false light publicity. Thus, because the message was
viewed by an insufficient number of people to constitute the "public at
large", summary judgment is proper as to false light publicity.
IlI.
The First District Court of Appeals properly granted summary judgment as to Tekhead's claim of intrusion upon seclusion. Dospam did not
intrude into Tekhead's seclusion because Tekhead did not have an actual
expectation of seclusion in his e-mail address book. If Tekhead did have
an expectation of seclusion, then that expectation is unreasonable.
Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Dospam was proper.
Dospam did not intrude into Tekhead's seclusion by collecting his email address book because the address book was not secluded. Seclusion
does not exist when the plaintiff does not exhibit an actual expectation of
seclusion in the matter. By putting his personal contacts into an address
book he knew was not confidential according to company policy, which he
signed, Tekhead indicated he did not consider the address book to be
secluded. Thus, summary judgment was properly granted because there
was no seclusion as a matter of law.
Even if this court holds that the e-mail address book was secluded, it
should still affirm summary judgment for Dospam because this expectation of privacy was unreasonable. Tekhead's e-mail address book was
placed on his work computer and was part of the workplace environment. Further, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because
Tekhead was subject to a computer policy which stated that Tekhead's
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use of the computer would not be private. Finally, any reasonable expectation of privacy was destroyed when Tekhead placed his address book
on a computer accessible by third parties. Tekhead knew that the e-mail
address book was accessible to third parties because the policy he signed
informed him of that fact. Therefore, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his Outlook program and summary
judgment was properly granted to Dospam on this issue.
ARGUMENT
I. THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT JURISDICTION OVER DOSPAM WAS PROPER
BECAUSE DOSPAM'S CONTACTS WITH THE STATE OF
MARSHALL WERE INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS.
The appellate court erred in ruling that jurisdiction over Dospam
was properly acquired. This decision is contrary to the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Marshall's exercise of jurisdiction over Dospam offends "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Miliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). First,
Dospam does not have systematic and continuous contacts with the State
of Marshall. Second, Dospam did not purposefully direct his activities
into the State of Marshall. Finally, assertion ofjurisdiction over Dospam
would be unreasonable. Therefore, the lower court should be reversed
and Dospam's motion for summary judgment as to jurisdiction should be
granted.
Under MARSHALL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c), a party is entitled to summary judgment if the evidence on record demonstrates the
absence of any genuine issues of material fact, and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Marshall R. Civ. P. 56(c); see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A party is entitled
to summary judgment if "under the governing law, there can be but one
reasonable conclusions as to the verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Dospam was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the undisputed facts demonstrate that
jurisdiction over Dospam is impermissible.
A district court may only render judgment against a person over
whom it has acquired personal jurisdiction. Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine,
395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969). The trial court's determination of the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law subject to de
novo review. See PacificAtlantic Trading Co. v. MI V Main Express, 758
F.2d 1325, 1326 (9th Cir. 1985). When a nonresident defendant challenges personal jurisdiction the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
the district court's jurisdiction over the defendant. See Felch v. Trans-
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portes Lar-Mex S.A. De CV, 92 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff "is obligated to come forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise,
supporting personal jurisdiction." Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927
(9th Cir. 1986).
The State of Marshall long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of
jurisdiction over a person as to any cause of action arising from the
transaction of any business within the State of Marshall. See MARSHALL
REVISED CODE, 735 MRC 25-302. The Marshall statute has been construed to permit the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted
by the Fourteenth Amendment. (R. at 8.) Thus, the issue before the
Court is whether the assertion of in personam jurisdiction in this case
satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
circumstances in which a state may assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident individuals. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). In
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes significant
limits on the ability of states to employ long-arm statutes to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The defendant must have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. The minimum contacts inquiry
serves at least two interests. First, it protects the defendant from having
to defend a lawsuit in a jurisdiction where it has no meaningful contacts
and therefore may be unfamiliar with both the substantive and procedural law. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086,
1090 (10th Cir. 1998). Second, it acts to ensure that the state courts do
not reach beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system. Id. Courts consider the due process analysis as a two part inquiry: (1) the court must determine whether "minimum contacts" exist and, if so, (2) the court must determine whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Tingstol Co. v. Rainbow Sales, Inc., 8 F.
Supp. 2d 1113, 1115 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
A. DosPAM

DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE

STATE OF MARSHALL TO SUPPORT PERSONAL JURISDICTION

To determine whether minimum contacts have been satisfied, a
court should look at the degree to which a defendant purposely initiated
activity within the state. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1978). A
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum must be such that it
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. World-Wide
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Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Such a defendant
has enjoyed the benefits and protections of that state's laws, and jurisdiction over it satisfies due process. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
In determining whether minimum contacts exist so as to permit an
assertion of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has distinguished "general"
and "specific" in personam jurisdiction. See Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8, 9 (1984); Calder v. Jones,
465 U.S. 783, 787 (1984). In order to assert jurisdiction when the cause
of action does not arise out of or relate to the defendant's activities in the
forum state, those activities must be sufficiently continuous and systematic to make the assertion of in personam jurisdiction reasonable. See
Perkins v. Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952).
Those contacts must be "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify
suit against [the defendant] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely different from those activities." Intl. Shoe, 326 US. at 318. If they
are, then the forum state can exercise general jurisdiction over the defendant notwithstanding the lack of a connection between the activities and
the cause of action. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 447-48. Specific jurisdiction, on
the other hand, can be asserted despite a lesser showing of contacts with
the forum state, so long as "the defendant has 'purposefully directed' his
activities at residents of the forum . . .and the litigation results from
alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
1.

The assertion of general jurisdictionover Dospam is inappropriate
because he does not have continuous and systematic contacts
with the State of Marshall

The appellate court erred when it ruled that Dospam has "extensive
contacts" with the State of Marshall justifying general jurisdiction. (See
R. at 9.) The Supreme Court has said that general jurisdiction exists
only when a defendant's contacts with the forum state are "continuous
and systematic." Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414-16. Under this standard
courts "regularly have declined to find general jurisdiction even where
the contacts were quite extensive." Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993). "The standard for establishing general jurisdiction is 'fairly high' . . . and requires that the
defendant's contacts be of the sort that approximates physical presence."
Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Natl. Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000).
In Perkins, the Supreme Court found systematic and continuous
contacts sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation where the president of the corporation maintained an office in the
forum and conducted business on behalf of the company, kept company
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files in the forum, held director's meetings in the forum, and held bank
accounts in the forum. 342 U.S. at 447-47. In Helicopteros, the plaintiffs
brought suit in Texas against a Colombian helicopter transportation provider for injuries suffered in a crash in Peru. Id. at 411. The plaintiffdecedents' employer, a Texas joint venture, contracted with the defendant for the use of helicopters to transport the decedents to their workplace in Peru. Id. The contract was executed in Peru, but a
representative of the defendant went to Texas once to negotiate the deal.
Id. In addition, the defendant purchased helicopters and spare parts
from a Texas company and sent pilots to Texas for training. Id. The
Supreme Court concluded that purchases and unrelated trips, standing
alone, are not a sufficient basis for a state's assertion of jurisdiction. Id.
at 420.
In this case, Dospam's contacts with the State of Marshall are insufficient to grant general jurisdiction over Dospam. Dospam does not
maintain an office in Marshall and does not carry on general business
activities in the state. The only current contact Dospam has with Marshall is his operation of Webgags.com, which is accessible to anyone in
the world with access to the Internet. (See R. at 6.) Dospam grew up in
Marshall, but is no longer a resident of Marshall. (R. at 6.) Dospam also
submitted resumes to several companies in Marshall over seven years
ago. (R. at 6.) These are the only additional contacts that Dospam has
with the State of Marshall as set out in the record. If purchases and
unrelated trips are insufficient to assert jurisdiction, as they were in
Helicopteros, then Dospam's limited contacts set out in the record are
even less sufficient to assert jurisdiction.
2.

Dospam's previous contacts with the State of Marshall are
irrelevant when determining whether general jurisdiction is
proper

Dospam's direct contacts with the State of Marshall ceased over six
years ago and are therefore irrelevant for the determination of jurisdiction. All of these contacts existed prior to the creation of Webgags.com.
(See R. at 6.) Contacts before the time of the alleged wrongdoing are
irrelevant in the consideration in establishing general jurisdiction. See
Clearclad Coatings, Inc., No. 98 C 7199, 1999 WL 652030, at *23 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 20, 1999); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Interstate Warehousing,
Inc., No. 96 C 5375, 1997 WL 189308, at *2 (ND. Ill. Apr. 15, 1997) (because the defendant had ceased all activities in the forum before the injury to the plaintiff, no general jurisdiction); Scherr v. Abrahams, No. 97
C 5453, 1998 WL 299678, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 1998) (contacts before
the allegedly infringing journal was created are not basis for jurisdiction). "[W]hat is relevant is whether [his] forum contacts at the time of
the incident complained of [were] continuous and systematic." Mobay
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Chemical Corp. v. Air Products and Chemicals Inc., 434 A.2d 1250, 1253
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1981). Therefore, because Dospam's contacts with Marshall ended six years prior to the incident complained of, his contacts
with Marshall were not "systematic and continuous" as the Fourteenth
Amendment requires and the appellate court erred in concluding "Dospam has other extensive contacts with the State of Marshall [justifying
the assertion of jurisdiction]." (R. at 8-9.)
3.

Dospam's Web site did not confer generaljurisdiction over him
because it is a "passive site"

Dospam's Web site is not grounds to assert general jurisdiction over
him because the Web site does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it. Zippo ManufacturingCo. v. Zippo
Dot Com, Inc. introduced the current test, called the "sliding scale," to
determine if a Web site confers jurisdiction to the forum state. 952 F.
Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). In that case, the court determined that "the
likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is
directly proportionate to the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Id. at 1124. The court
then developed a sliding scale to measure contacts with the forum:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly
does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts
with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is
accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does
little more than make information available to those who are interested
in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction. The middle
ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web
site.
Id. (citations omitted). Finding that jurisdiction was proper, the Zippo
court concluded that the defendant's actions of selling approximately
3,000 passwords and entering into seven contracts with Pennsylvania
residents "constitute[d] the purposeful availment of doing business in
Pennsylvania." Id. at 1126.
A passive Web site "does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it." Id. at 1124. A majority of courts
agree that a passive Web site may not serve as the basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction. See e.g. Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 259 n.3
(3d Cir. 2001); GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth, 199 F.3d
1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Mink v. AAAA Development, LLC, 190
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F.3d 333, 336-37 (5th Cir. 1999); 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160
F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Bensusan Restaraunt Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d
25 (2d Cir. 1997); Miami Breakers Soccer Club, Inc. v. Women's United
Soccer Ass'n, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1329-30 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Callaway
Golf Corp. v. Royal CanadianGolf Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1203-04
(C.D. Cal. 2000); Amberson Holdings,LLC v. Westside Story Newspaper,
110 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337 (D.N.J. 2000); Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86
F. Supp. 2d 790, 795-96 (E.D. Tenn. 2000); Brown v. Geha-Werke, 69 F.
Supp. 2d 770, 777-78 (D.S.C. 1999); Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F.
Supp. 2d 717, 723 (E.D. Pa. 1999). One opinion that exemplifies this proposition is Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell Inc., in which the court held that
maintenance of a Web site containing advertisements about its products
was not enough to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction. 130
F.3d 414, 420 (9th Cir. 1997). The Web site contained the Cybersell logo,
its telephone number, and an invitation for customers to contact the
owners via e-mail. Id. at 415. The site also included a link that allowed
users to post information about them. Id. In discussing the purposeful
availment issue, the court found that the defendant did not sell products
on its Web site or direct contacts to the forum. Id. at 419. Therefore, the
court held the exercise of jurisdiction was inappropriate. Id. at 419-20.
Dospam's Web site is passive because unlike the defendant in Zippo,
Dospam did not sell anything to the residents of the forum, or enter into
any contracts with them. In fact, Dospam's Web site is even more passive than the Web site in Cybersell because Dospam's Web site did not
include a link where users could post information about themselves, a
telephone number, or an invitation to e-mail the owner. Further, the
advertisements on Dospam's Web site were for other companies' products. (R. at 6.) Dospam's Web site simply posts information that is accessible to users in any foreign jurisdiction. If this Court were to rule
that Dospam's Web site conferred jurisdiction, then every complaint arising out of the use of the Internet would automatically result in personal
jurisdiction whenever the plaintiff is located in Marshall. This does not
comport with what the Supreme Court has defined as invoking the benefits and protections of the forum state and would violate due process.
B.

THE ASSERTION OF SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OVER

DosPAM

IS

INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE HE DID NOT PURPOSEFULLY AVAIL HIMSELF OF
THE LAW OF MARSHALL

Specific jurisdiction is also inappropriate over Dospam because he
did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities
in the State of Marshall. Specific jurisdiction arises when the defendant's contacts with the forum are related to the controversy underlying
the litigation. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8. If the defendant's
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activities are not "substantial" or "continuous and systematic," the court
may not exercise jurisdiction unless the following three criteria are met:
(1) the nonresident purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws; (2) the claim arose out of or resulted from the
defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) an exercise of jurisdiction
would be reasonable. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement
Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986).
1.

Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the law of Marshall
because the June 13 e-mail was not sent for pecuniary gain

Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the State of Marshall because his e-mail was not
sent for direct financial gain. In order for an e-mail to meet the purposeful availment requirement, courts that have addressed the issue
have held that the e-mail, at a minimum, must have been sent for pecuniary gain. See Verizon Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d
601 (E.D. Va. 2002); Reliance Natl. Indemnity Co. v. Pinnacle CasualAssurance Corp., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1327 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (citing Internet
Doorway, Inc. v. Parks, 138 F. Supp. 2d 773, 779 (S.D. Miss. 2001)). Dospam may eventually hope to reap a pecuniary gain off of his Web site,
but as of yet he is not doing so. (R. at 6.) While Dospam's e-mail was
sent out as a promotional tool, there is no evidence that the purpose of
the e-mail was pecuniary gain. Dospam's Web site does contain paid advertisements (R. at 6.); however, there is no evidence that these advertisements are dependent upon traffic to the Web site. Therefore, because
the June 13 e-mail was not sent for pecuniary gain, Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
State of Marshall through that e-mail.
2.

Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the law of Marshall
because the June 13 e-mail did not have a substantial connection
with the State of Marshall

Even if this Court finds that Dospam's e-mail was sent for pecuniary
gain, the e-mail did not have a "substantial connection" with the State of
Marshall. While the Supreme Court has held that a single contact can
serve as the exclusive basis for finding that the defendant "purposefully
availed himself' of the privileges of the forum, that contact must have a
"substantial connection with [the forum] State." See McGee v. Intl. Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). In McGee, the Texas defendant's sole
connection with the California forum was the mailing of an offer to renew a life insurance contract to the decedent at his California home. Id.
The Supreme Court upheld the California courts' jurisdiction over the
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subsequent suit on the insurance contract by the plaintiff beneficiary.
Id. However, the court based its holding on the fact that the "contract ... had substantial connection with [the forum] State." Id. This
substantial connection arose from several facts: the contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there, and the insured died there. Id.
Unlike McGee, where there was a substantial connection between
the single contract and the forum state, the only connection here is that
an e-mail sent from Potter was opened in Marshall. To say that Dospam's single e-mail solicitation to Tekhead created a "substantial connection" with Marshall renders the concept of "substantiality"
meaningless. Because the June 13 e-mail was not substantially related
to Marshall, the appellate court erred in finding jurisdiction proper.
3.

Dospam did not purposefully avail himself of the law of Marshall
by posting Tekhead's Outlook address book on his Web site

Dospam did not target the State of Marshall by publishing
Tekhead's Outlook address book on Webgags.com. A review of several
cases specifically addressing Internet contacts reveals that the purposeful availment requirement is absent in this case. For instance, in
Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728, the court concluded that the defendant
had not purposefully availed itself of the forum by simply posting allegedly defamatory statements and articles about the plaintiff on two informational Web sites maintained by the defendant and in messages that
the defendant posted on e-mail news groups that had links back to the
defendant's Web sites. Id. Specifically, the court ruled that because "the
nature and quality of the contacts made by the Defendant were accessible around the world and never targeted nor solicited [the forum's] residents," such contacts were insufficient to trigger specific personal
jurisdiction. Id. The court distinguished the defendant's postings on the
Internet from magazines or newspapers stating: "Unlike distributors of
magazines or other materials who can affirmatively decide not to sell or
distribute to certain forums, after posting to a[n] [e-mail] discussion
group . . . the option of bypassing certain regions is not available." Id.
Similarly, the court in Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp.
295, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997), held that "[the
defendant] has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits
of [the forum]. [The defendant], like numerous others, simply created a
Website and permitted anyone who could find it to access it. Creating a
site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide - or even worldwide - but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum state."
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As in Barrett, where the defendant did not target the forum by publishing allegedly defamatory statements on its Web sites, Dospam did
not target Marshall by placing Tekhead's address book on Webgags.com.
Dospam's Web site was available around the world, and there is no evidence that he specifically encouraged residents of Marshall to visit the
site. Unlike a magazine or newspaper publisher, Dospam could not
choose to have his Web site bypass certain regions. The nature and quality of the contacts made by Dospam may have been felt around the world,
but such contacts are insufficient to trigger specific personal jurisdiction
in Marshall.
C.

JURISDICTION

OVER DosPAM

OFFENDS TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF

FAIR PLAY AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE

Even if this Court holds that Dospam satisfies the minimum contacts requirement of the due process analysis, the appellate court should
have concluded that jurisdiction over Dospam is fundamentally unfair
because litigating in Marshall is too high of a burden for Dospam. In
InternationalShoe, the Supreme Court noted that in addition to minimum contacts with the state, the court must also consider other factors
to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 326 U.S. at 316.
One of the factors that must be considered is the burden on the defendant. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292. As noted in WorldWide Volkswagen, the burden on the defendant is "always a primary concern." 444 U.S. at 292.
The Supreme Court elaborated on the burden issue in Burger King.
471 U.S. 462. In that case, the Court expressed concern about asserting
personal jurisdiction over out-of-state consumer defendants. Id. at 48586. The Court noted that "[t]he 'quality and nature' of an interstate
transaction may sometimes be so 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated'
that it cannot fairly be said that the potential defendant 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court' in another jurisdiction." Id. at 486
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297). The Court explained
that the Due Process Clause would "prevent rules that would unfairly
enable [plaintiffs] to obtain default judgments against unwitting [defendants]." Id. In Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., the
court applied the reasoning of Burger King in a case denying personal
jurisdiction over a defendant computer database user. 636 S.2d 1351,
1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The court expressed concern that by simply using an online service, defendants would be subject to jurisdiction
wherever the online service's database was located. "Such a result," the
court noted, "is wildly beyond the reasonable expectations of such com-

358

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

Nol. XXII

puter-information users, and, accordingly the result offends traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id.
Dospam's case is analogous to the "out-of-state consumer" discussed
in Burger King, and the "out-of-state computer-system user" discussed in
Pres-Kap. Dospam set up a Web site and sent out promotional e-mail
without realizing the legal implications of what he was doing. He was as
"unwitting" as the out-of-state consumer who makes small purchases.
There is no way possible that Dospam could have known for certain that
Tekhead would open the e-mail in the State of Marshall. The fact that
Tekhead did open the e-mail in the State of Marshall was just a 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' act. There isn't even an indication in
the record that Dospam was even aware of the residency of the individuals to whom his e-mails were directed. However, even if this had been
shown, it would not have altered Dospam's reasonable expectation that
any litigation over the contents of his e-mails would be litigated in the
State of Potter. The notion that he could be sued in Marshall by sending
out a single e-mail to an unknown regional location was "wildly beyond
his reasonable expectations," and therefore offends traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
Dospam does not have minimum contacts with the State of Marshall, and personal jurisdiction over Dospam would be unreasonable.
The State of Marshall cannot assert general jurisdiction over Dospam
because he does not have "continuous and systematic" contacts with the
forum. Further, specific jurisdiction is inappropriate because Dospam
did not purposefully avail himself of the laws of Marshall. Finally, personal jurisdiction over Dospam would be unreasonable because Dospam
could not have anticipated being haled into court in Marshall based on a
single e-mail message. Therefore, this Court should hold that the appellate court erred in not granting Dospam's motion for summary judgment
as to personal jurisdiction and dismiss this action.
II. THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
GRANTED DOSPAM'S MOTION AS TO FALSE LIGHT PUBLICITY
BECAUSE TEKHEAD WAS NOT PLACED IN A FALSE LIGHT, NOR
WAS ANY MATTER CONCERNING HIM MADE PUBLIC
Should this Court determine that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Dospam is permissible, it should hold that the appellate court
correctly granted Dospam's motion as to false light publicity because the
evidence shows that Tekhead was neither placed in a false light, nor was
any matter concerning him made public. Dospam is entitled to summary
judgment because the undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that
there is no publicity placing Tekhead in a false light, or intrusion upon
Tekhead's seclusion, as a matter of law. Therefore, the First District
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Court of Appeals' decision granting summary judgment in favor of Dospam as to these issues should be affirmed.
As Professor Prosser noted, invasion of privacy is now "declared to
exist by the overwhelming majority of American courts." William L.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960). Professor Prosser had
concluded that invasion of privacy was "not one tort, but a complex of
four." Id. at 389. The Second Restatement adopted Prosser's view,
describing four distinct injuries: (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of likeness, (3) public disclosure of private facts, and (4) false-

light publicity.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 652A (1977). In this

case Tekhead has alleged that Dospam committed the torts of intrusion
upon seclusion and false-light publicity.
A.

THE JUNE

13

E-MAIL DID NOT PLACE

The courts of Marshall follow the

DosPAM

IN A FALSE LIGHT

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

governing claims for invasion of privacy stemming from publicity placing
a person in a false light. (R. at 9.) The relevant text of section 652E
reads: "One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that
places the other before the public in a false light is subject to the liability
to the other for invasion of privacy. . . ." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E (1977). The Court of Appeals correctly held that summary
judgment was proper because the June 13 e-mail did not place Tekhead
in a "false light" before the public.
1.

The June 13 e-mail could not have reasonably been taken as
factual

Tekhead was not placed in a false light through the content of Dospam's e-mail message. No reasonable viewer of the e-mail would treat
the contents of the e-mail as a factual commentary that Tekhead was a
pornographer. Since the e-mail could not be taken as factual, the e-mail
does not amount to false light invasion of privacy because Tekhead's coworkers and supervisor did not receive a false impression about
Tekhead.
While the false light invasion of privacy tort protects individuals
from major misrepresentations of character, history, activities or beliefs,
if a statement cannot reasonably be taken as factual, the statement does
not amount to false light invasion of privacy because the public did not
receive a false impression about the plaintiff. Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). A false light
claim is "closely allied" with an action for defamation, and "the same considerations apply to each." Cibenko v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 510 F.
Supp. 761, 766-67 (D.N.J. 1981). Under the law of defamation, "[a] parody or spoof that no reasonable person would read as a factual statement
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or anything other than a joke ... cannot be actionable as a defamation."
Walko v. Kean College, 561 A.2d 680, 683 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1988). Similarly, "an action for 'false light' invasion of privacy cannot
survive when the publication or statement sued upon cannot be reasonably viewed as a factual claim and is nothing more than a joke or a spoof."
Stien, 944 P.2d at 380.
For example, in Stien, the defendants made a video in which the
plaintiff was asked to describe in detail a chore he hated doing. Id. at
376. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff the video was edited to make it appear as if the plaintiff were answering the question, "What's sex like
with your partner?" Id. The court held that "an action for false light
invasion of privacy cannot survive when the publication or statement
sued upon cannot be reasonably viewed as a factual claim and is nothing
more than a joke or spoof." Id.; see also Partington v. Bugliosi, 825 F.
Supp. 906, 925 (D. Haw. 1993); Hicks v. CasablancaRecords, 464 F.
Supp. 426, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Byrd v. HustlerMag., Inc., 433 S.2d 593,
595 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Walko, 561 A.2d at 683. Similarly, in
Walko, a college administrator brought an action for false light publicity
for a phony ad placed in a student newspaper. 561 A.2d at 682. The ad
was included among several other phony ads and identified the plaintiff,
among three other individuals, as someone available for "good phone
sex." Id. The court held that because "no reasonable reader would interpret the ad . . . as a factual claim about the plaintiffs ability for 'good
telephone sex' the 'false light' cause of action must ... fail." Id. at 688.
See also Pring v. Penthouse Intl., Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 441-42 (10th Cir.
1982) (sexual parody in magazine did not place the plaintiff in a false
light when the parody could not be taken literally and could not reasonably be considered a statement of fact).
Any communication by the June 13 e-mail that Dospam was viewing
pornography on his computer cannot reasonably be taken as factual.
The e-mail contained an animated image of George and Jane Jetson
dancing the fandango on the screen. (R. at 5.) The e-mail also audibly
announced "ALERT! STOP VIEWING PORN! CLOSE YOUR
BROWSER IMMEDIATELY!" (R. at 7.) Just like the video in Stien, or
the phony ad in Walko, the reasonable viewer of this message would
have concluded that this was a practical joke. However, if there were
any doubt in the viewer's mind, the message also displayed a hyperlink
on the screen with the caption "Click here to send this or other delightful
Webgags to a friend," making it clear that this was intended to be a joke.
(R. at 7.) Therefore, the message does not amount to false light invasion
of privacy because Tekhead's co-workers and supervisor did not receive a
false impression that the plaintiff was a pornographer.
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The June 13 e-mail did not attribute to Tekhead characteristics
that were false

The reasonable viewer of this e-mail message would have concluded
that it was a practical joke. The only impression that the message in the
e-mail could have created about Tekhead was that he was a practical
jokester. An essential requirement of the false light element of this tort
is that any publicity attributes to the plaintiff characteristics, conduct or
beliefs that are false. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b.
(1977). However, as the record evidences, Tekhead was already known
to be a practical jokester. Therefore, the June 13 e-mail did not attribute
to him characteristics that were false.
To constitute the tort of invasion of privacy by publicity that places
one in a false light, there must be established as one of the elements of
the tort that the publicity "depicts the plaintiff as something or someone
he is not." Brown v. CapricornRecords, Inc., 222 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Ga.
App. 1975); see also Swerdlick v.Kock, 721 A.2d 849, 862 (R.I. 1998) ("defendant's statements, while sometimes overstated or slightly off the
mark in one factual detail or another, nonetheless were based on substantially true facts, and thus cannot be relied upon to support an action
for false light"). In Brown, a blind preacher and singer, whose songs
were only religious, was held not to have been falsely represented on a
record album cover of a rock and roll band. Id. at 620. The court acknowledged in that case, that the photograph in question portrayed the
plaintiff in front of a liquor store with the imputation that he was involved therewith, and implied an association with rock musicians. Id. at
619. However, the court pointed to evidence establishing that the plaintiff was indeed a frequenter of that particular liquor store, and had been
associated with rock and roll musicians in the past, so that whatever
embarrassment he might have received from the album cover's publication, the cover did not portray him falsely. Id. at 619-20.
The element of falsity is absent in this case, as well. As early as
Tekhead's first performance review in December of 2000, comments from
his supervisors included "a lack of enthusiasm, an apparent desire to distract other employees," and "a 'jokester' attitude." (R. at 3.) At his next
performance review six months later, his supervisors again noted his unruly sense of humor. One supervisor commented that, "[hie enjoys practical jokes, and has played quite a few in the past ninety days. His sense
of humor tends to be on the boisterous side, and this has been a distraction among his fellow employees from time to time." (R. at Ex. B-1.) Another supervisor noted that "if this trend he has shown continues, it may
very well happen [that Mr. Tekhead will become a liability]." (R. at Ex.
B-3.) Tekhead may have toned down his sense of humor in order to save
his job (See R. at Ex. C.); however, he was still not portrayed falsely, just

362

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XXII

as the plaintiff in Brown was not portrayed in a false light even after he
had stopped associating with rock and roll musicians. Therefore, because
Tekhead cannot prove that he was placed in a false light, summary judgment as to the false light publicity claim was proper.

B.

THE JUNE

13

E-MAIL DID NOT

GIVE

PUBLICITY TO ANY MATTER

CONCERNING TEKHEAD

Even if Tekhead was placed in a false light, the appellate court correctly held that the false light was not made publicly. Publicity "means
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. a. (1977). Therefore, Dospam did not
make any matter concerning Tekhead public because, "it is not an invasion of privacy to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiffs private
life to a single person or even a small group of persons." Id. This court
should adhere to this rule because it properly constrains the tort of false
light publicity.
1.

An insufficient number of people viewed the e-mail to constitute
"publicity"

Dospam's e-mail was not communicated to the public because the
contents of the e-mail were not communicated to the public at large. The
Restatement distinguishes between "publicity" for purposes of invasion
of privacy, and "publication" as that term is used in connection with liability for defamation. Id. at § 652D cmt. a.' Publicity, unlike the element of publication in a defamation case, requires that the information
disclosed has or is substantially likely to become general knowledge to
the public at large. Id.; Jones v. U.S. Child Support Recovery, 961 F.
Supp. 1518, 1520-21 (D. Utah 1997); Kuhn v. Account Control Tech., 865
F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (D. Nev. 1994). Examples would include newspapers, magazines, handbills to a large number of people or a statement
made in an address to a large audience of people. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). For example, as the Restatement
illustrates, a creditor that posts a statement in the window of its shop
that a customer owes it a debt has invaded the customer's privacy. Id. at
§ 652D cmt. a, illus. 2; see also Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 968, 971
1. The publicity required for the tort of false light publicity is identical to that required for publication of private facts. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E cmts. a, b,
illus. 1-5 (1997). (The Restatement refers readers to comment a of § 652C which should
read § 652D. See Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 554 n.3 (Minn.
2003)). Therefore, it is proper to look to cases analyzing publicity with respect to publication of private facts when discussing false light publicity.
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(Ky. 1927) (posting a 5-by-8-foot notice calling attention to customer's
overdue account in a show window of an automobile garage constitutes
publicity).
In contrast, dissemination to only a handful of people, including the
plaintiffs employer and co-workers, does not constitute publicity as it is
defined in the Restatement. See e.g. C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79
F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084 (D. Minn. 1999) (the disclosure of private facts to
a few employees does not constitute publication); Dancy v. Fina Oil &
Chemical Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 737, 740 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (insufficient publication where "the allegedly publicized facts, at worst, were made know to
some workers in the refinery"); Wells v.Thomas, 569 F. Supp. 426, 437
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (publication to a community of employees at staff meetings and discussions between defendants and other employees does not
constitute "publicity"); Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663
N.W.2d 550, 558 (Minn. 2003) (distribution of names and social security
numbers of 204 employees to 16 terminal managers did not constitute
publicity); Doe v.Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 692 (Ind. 1997) (disclosures to co-workers that the plaintiff was HIV positive was not "publicity"); Eddy v.Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 78 (Okla. 1986) (disclosure to coworkers that the plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy was not
"publicity"); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1974) (there
was no "publicity" where three relatives and an employer were notified of
plaintiffs indebtedness). The Restatement provides the following illustration, which exemplifies this principle: "A, a creditor writes a letter to
the employer of B, his debtor, informing him that B owes the debt and
will not pay it. This is not an invasion of B's privacy under this section."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a, illus. 1 (1997) (emphasis added). Relying on this illustration, the court in Kuhn held that there
was no publicity when any dissemination that occurred was limited to
the small group of the plaintiffs co-workers and was not made "public."
865 F. Supp. at 1447. In that case a creditor made six separate phone
calls to the plaintiffs employer in an attempt to collect a debt. Id. The
court concluded, that under these facts, "while a private fact may have
been disclosed, it was not made 'public' as that term is used in the Restatement." Id.
Similarly in Jones, the court concluded that delivery of a poster to
the plaintiffs employer as well as a few close relatives was not "publicity." 961 F. Supp. at 1521. In that case defendants threatened to disseminate a dead-beat parent "wanted poster" to the public at large, but
in fact only delivered the poster to the plaintiffs employer, mother and
two siblings. Id. The court held that distribution to this "handful of people" was insufficient to constitute publicity. Id.
Tekhead's claim of false light publicity fails because he cannot prove
that the contents of Dospam's e-mail message were communicated to the
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"public at large." The facts of this case are parallel to these cases that
held that any dissemination of private information was insufficient to
constitute publicity. Any information that was communicated about
Dospam was disseminated to no more than five of Dospam's co-workers
and a supervisor. (R. at 5.) As the cases illustrate, this small group of
Tekhead's co-workers falls very short of the number of people the courts
consider adequate to satisfy the element of "publicity."
2.

This court should follow the rule adhered to by a majority of courts
which requirepublicity to the public at large

The Restatement definition of "publicity" appropriately limits the
false light publicity cause of action. See Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 557.
Therefore, this court should follow the majority of other courts that have
rejected the "special relationship" approach taken by a very limited number of jurisdictions. A minority of jurisdictions have concluded that in
situations where there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and
the public, a departure from the Restatement's publicity requirement is
warranted. See Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (Mich. 1977)
(holding a disclosure made to "a particular public with a special relationship to the plaintiff, such as co-workers, family, or neighbors, could be
actionable), overruled on other grounds by Bradley v. Saranac Community School Board of Education, 565 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Mich. 1997). This
approach broadens the scope of the tort of invasion of privacy beyond its
intended and necessary protections.
The invasion of privacy tort had its beginning in an 1890 law review
article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis entitled: The
Right to Privacy. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1891). They were seeking "a
principle which can properly be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual." Id. at 197. Warren and Brandeis were especially concerned
with "the evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers." Id. at 195.
This new right was not intended to be boundless: the authors recognized
its limitations. Its object was solely to "protect the privacy of private life,
and to whatever connection a man's life has ceased to be private . . . to
that extent the protection is to be withdrawn." Id. at 215 (emphasis added). Professor Prosser noted the danger of expanding the tort of invasion of privacy:
[0]ne disposed to alarm might express the greatest concern over where
privacy may be going. The question may well be raised, and apparently
still is unanswered, whether this branch of the tort is not capable of
swallowing up and engulfing the whole law of public defamation.... If
that turns out to be the case, it may well be asked, what of the numerous restrictions and limitations which have hedged defamation about
for many years, in the interest of freedom of the press and the discour-
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agement of trivial and extortionate claims? Are they of so little consequence that they may be circumvented in so casual and cavalier a
fashion?
Prosser, supra, at 401. These concerns are just as legitimate today as
they were when Professor Prosser first expressed them over forty years
ago.
Following the reasoning set out by Warren and Brandeis, and Professor Prosser, the court in Bodah declined to accept the minority rule,
stating: "We also reject the 'special relationship' or 'particular public' approach taken by some jurisdictions." Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 556. The
court there, specifically addressing the tort of publication of private
facts, reasoned that the tort focused on a very narrow law that was nonactionable under defamation rules. The court concluded that "[t]he Restatement's definition of 'publicity,' which requires a broad reach, constrains the tort of publication of private facts."
As noted, a false light claim is very similar to an action for defamation. Cibenko 510 F. Supp. at 766-67. However, as Warren and Brandeis' article reflects, this tort was not intended to evade the law of
defamation. The Restatement properly constrains this tort in order to
avoid circumventing the elements of defamation "in so casual and cavalier a fashion." This court should follow the majority of other courts that
adhere to the Restatement's definition of "publicity" and reject the "special relationship" approach to the false light tort.
Therefore, even if personal jurisdiction over Dospam was properly
asserted, Tekhead's claim of publicity placing him in a false light before
the public fails as a matter of law. The June 13 e-mail did not place
Tekhead in a false light because the e-mail could not have reasonably
been construed as factual. The only matter that could have been communicated about Tekhead was that he was a practical jokester; however,
because Tekhead was a practical jokester, this message did not place him
in a false light. If the June 13 e-mail did place Tekhead in a false light,
his claim of false light publicity still fails because he was not placed in a
false light before the public at large. Therefore, this Court should hold
that the appellate court properly granted summary judgment to Dospam
as to Tekhead's claim of false light publicity.
III. THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
GRANTED DOSPAM'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS
TO INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION BECAUSE DOSPAM DID NOT
INTRUDE UPON TEKHEAD'S SECLUSION BY COLLECTING HIS
E-MAIL ADDRESS BOOK
Should this Court determine that personal jurisdiction over Dospam
was proper, Tekhead's claim of intrusion upon seclusion fails. An intru-
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sion upon seclusion occurs when a person commits (1) an unauthorized
intrusion or prying into the plaintiffs seclusion; (2) the intrusion is
highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person; (3) the matter on
which the intrusion occurs is private; and (4) the intrusion causes
anguish and suffering. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
The issues in dispute in this case are whether the conduct here constitutes an unauthorized intrusion or prying into Tekhead's seclusion, and
whether the matter on which the alleged intrusion occurs was private.
(R. at 10.) Dospam did not intrude into Tekhead's seclusion because
Tekhead did not have an actual expectation of seclusion in the e-mail
address book. Even if Tekhead did have an actual expectation of solitude, that expectation was unreasonable. Therefore, this Court should
hold that the appellate court correctly granted summary judgment in
favor of Dospam as to this issue.
A.

TEKHEAD'S OUTLOOK ADDRESS BOOK WAS NOT SECLUDED BECAUSE
HE HAD NO ACTUAL EXPECTATION OF SECLUSION

Dospam did not intrude into Tekhead's seclusion by collecting his email address book because the address book was not secluded. A defendant is subject to liability for intrusion upon seclusion "when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a private seclusion
that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c. (1976). Seclusion does not exist when
the plaintiff does not exhibit an actual expectation of seclusion in the
matter. Med. Laboratory Mgt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Companies,
306 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir 2002); Kemp v.Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264
(D. Nev. 1985). Tekhead's e-mail address book was not secluded because
Tekhead did not exhibit an expectation of seclusion by placing it on Distress' computer system.
A subjective expectation of seclusion is tested by any outward manifestations by Tekhead that he expected his e-mail address book to be
confidential. See id. Kemp is instructive on this principle. In that case,
the plaintiff, a technician, had a loud argument with the defendant, who
was his foreman in the instrument shop where they both worked. Id. at
1263. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the defendant tape-recorded the argument. Id. In dismissing the plaintiffs invasion of privacy claim, the
court noted that the plaintiff could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the plaintiff argued in a loud voice, and the small
size of the shop and lack of interior walls further indicated that an expectation of privacy would be objectively unreasonable. Id. Further, the instrument shop was a place where the plaintiffs co-workers had a right to
be and the plaintiff did not "have a right to exclude other persons from
entering the shop while the argument ensued." Id. The court concluded,
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therefore, that the plaintiff knew that others could overhear the argument and he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
Similarly, in Medical Laboratory Management Consultants v. Amercian Broadcasting Companies the Ninth Circuit held that there is no
subjective expectation of seclusion in information readily exposed to
others. 306 F.3d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 2002). In that case, a laboratory
technician who was conducting a tour claimed that he had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the laboratory where he conducted his meeting
with undercover representatives from American Broadcasting Companies ("ABC") and gave them a tour. Id. In discharging his claim, the
court noted the technician's willingness to invite the strangers into the
administrative offices for a meeting and then give a tour of the premises.
Id. The court reasoned that the fact that he had no expectation of privacy in the parts of the lab that he showed to the ABC representatives
was exemplified by the fact that the technician did not allow access to his
personal office. Id. The court concluded that the technician's conduct
reflected that he regarded his office as private, but not the other parts of
the laboratory's administrative offices that he readily exposed to the undercover representatives. Id. at 814.
By placing personal contacts into an address book he knew was not
confidential according to company policy, Tekhead indicated that he did
not consider his e-mail address book to be secluded. The Distress electronic information systems policy, which Tekhead acknowledged by signature at the onset of his employment, informs employees that the
company reserves the right to "access, monitor, and disclose communications and information stored in ... any part of its electronic information
systems." (R. at Ex. A-1.) As in Kemp, Tekhead did not have a right to
exclude others from viewing his Outlook address book. Tekhead gave up
all expectations of seclusion when he "readily exposed" his address book
to Distress. See Am. Broad. Companies, 306 F.3d at 814. Thus, summary judgment for Dospam was correctly granted because Tekhead's
Outlook address book did not constitute seclusion as a matter of law.
B.

ANY EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY THAT TEKHEAD HAD WAS
OBJECTIVELY UNREASONABLE

Should the Court find that Tekhead's e-mail address book was secluded, summary judgment was still proper because this expectation of
privacy was objectively unreasonable. The Restatement requires that
the matter upon which an alleged intrusion occurs be private in order to
sustain an intrusion upon seclusion claim. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652B (1977). Even if Tekhead expected his e-mail address book
to be private, this expectation was unreasonable because his e-mail address book was company property. Also, this expectation was unreasona-
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ble because Dospam's use of the e-mail address book was subject to
company policy. Further, any reasonable expectation of privacy was forfeited when he placed private information within reach of a third party
by using a company information system. Therefore, the court of appeals
correctly granted Dospam's motion for summary judgment as to intrusion upon seclusion.
1.

Tekhead had no reasonable expectation of privacy because his email address book was company property and subject to
monitoring by Distress.

Tekhead had no expectation of privacy in his e-mail address book
because it was placed on his work computer. "An employee's expectation
of privacy is lower in the workplace areas and items that are related to
work and are generally within the employer's control." Adkins v. KellySpringfield Tire Co., No. 97 C 50381, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16816, at *9
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 1998) (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715
(1987)). In O'Connor, the U.S. Supreme Court outlined the boundaries
for an employee's expectation of privacy in the work environment. 480
U.S. at 715 (holding that a government employee had a reasonable expectation under the Fourth Amendment to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure in the workplace). The Court explained that the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets are all part of the workplace regardless of whether they contain an employee's personal items.
Id. On the other hand, not every personal effect an employee brings into
the workplace becomes subject to an employers search. Id. If an employee brings a closed briefcase into the office, the contents of the case
remain protected by traditional privacy considerations. Id. However, expectations of privacy may be reduced in the public or private sector by
virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. Id. at 717.
Following this reasoning, a Texas court ruled that searching e-mail
stored in an employee's private computer folder is not the same as
searching an employee locker, for which courts have held an employee
does have a reasonable expectation of privacy. McLaren v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *11-12 (Tex.
App. May 28, 1999). In that case, after being sued for sexual harassment, the plaintiff sued the based on invasion of privacy, alleging that
the defendant broke into the personal folders on his office computer to
read his e-mail. Id. at *2. He argued that there was an expectation of
privacy because the personal folders were only accessible with a personal
password. Id. The court rejected this argument, holding instead that he
had no reasonable expectation of privacy because "the e-mail messages
contained on the company computer were not [the plaintiffs] personal
property, but were merely part of the office environment." Id. at *11.
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Similar to the filing cabinet in O'Connor, and the personal folders in
McLaren, Tekhead's e-mail address book was part of the workplace environment. Both the computer and Outlook e-mail program, which contained the address book, were both owned by Distress. (R. at Ex. A-1.)
The Outlook program electronically provides many of the same office
supplies such that companies have provided their employees for years.
The program arranges information using electronic files, folders, a
"desktop" and even a trash can. The address book was company property, and the use of the address book was limited to company business by
Distress' electronic communications Policy. (R. at Ex. A-2.) In fact,
Tekhead had an even less reasonable expectation of privacy that the
plaintiff in McLaren because in this case Tekhead signed a policy that
stated that he acknowledged that the passwords were property of Distress. Therefore, Dospam had no reasonable expectation of privacy because the e-mail addresses in his Outlook address book contained on the
company computer were not his personal property, but were merely part
of the office environment.
2.

Tekhead had no reasonable expectation of privacy because his email address book was subject to a company policy

Further, any expectation that Tekhead had that his Outlook e-mail
address book would be private was unreasonable because he signed a
company policy that stated that his e-mails would be monitored. An employee lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy when the employer has
instituted a company Internet policy. U.S. v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398
(4th Cir. 2000). In Simons, the court held that a government employee
"did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the record or fruits of his Internet use in light of the [agency] policy." Id. The
policy stated that the agency would "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" all
Internet and e-mail activity. Id. The court concluded that whether or
not the employee believed the files transferred from the Internet were
private, his belief was not reasonable in light of his knowledge of the
policy. Id.
Several other circuit courts have held that a company policy may
destroy employee privacy expectations. Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333
(6th Cir. 2001); Muick v.Glenayre Electronics, 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th
Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002). In
Muick, the Seventh Circuit held that an employee accused of receiving
and possessing child pornography on his laptop did not have a privacy
interest in the computer because it had been loaned to him by his employer for business use. Muick, 280 F.3d at 743. The court held that the
employee's reasonable privacy expectations had been destroyed when the
employer had announced that it could inspect employee laptops which it
provided. Id.
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Similarly, in Angevine, the Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma
State University professor who had downloaded obscene material from
the Internet did not have a privacy claim to the information on his computer. 281 F.3d 1135. The court found that the university's computer
policy made it clear to the professor that administrators regularly audited his computer, and that the data on his computer was "'fairly easy
to access' by third parties." Id. In light of the university privacy policy,
the court held that the professor's careless effort to maintain a privacy
interest indicated that he did not establish a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id.
As in the aforementioned cases, Tekhead did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his e-mail address book. The Distress information systems policy states that: "The Company reserves the right to access, monitor, and disclose communications and information stored in...
any part of its electronic information systems." Therefore, Tekhead
knew that Distress owned his system, would be monitoring his computer
use, and even owned his password. Any belief that Tekhead had that his
e-mail address book would remain private was unreasonable under these
circumstances.
3.

Tekhead's reasonable expectation of privacy was forfeited when he
placed his Outlook address book within reach of a third party by
using the Distress information system

Even if the fact that his e-mail address book was part of the workplace environment, and subject to company policy, did not destroy his
reasonable expectation of privacy, this expectation was forfeited when he
placed his address book on a Distress computer. Employee expectations
of privacy are destroyed when the employee places information within
reach of a third party by using the company information system. Smyth
v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa 1996); see also McLaren,
1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 4103, at *12 (holding an expectation of privacy
unreasonable when "any e-mail messages stored in [plaintiffs] personal
folders were first transmitted over the network and were at some point
accessible by a third-party"). Therefore, since Tekhead placed his e-mail
address book where a third party could reach it, he had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in it.
The Pillsbury court noted that the mere possibility of an e-mail message being intercepted rendered the employee's privacy expectation unreasonable.
In Pillsbury, the plaintiff claimed that the company
intruded upon his seclusion by terminating him based upon the contents
of private e-mail messages between him and his supervisor. Id. at 98.
The e-mail contemplated his private desire to poison fellow employees.
Id. The court held that once the plaintiff had placed the private informa-

2003]

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT

tion on a system that was accessible by third parties he forfeited any
right to expect privacy. Id. at 101. The court concluded that no intrusion
upon seclusion had taken place because the plaintiff was never forced to
make any of his private thoughts available to third parties. Id.
Similarly, in this case, no intrusion upon seclusion has taken place
because Tekhead placed his e-mail address book on a computer system
accessible by a third party. The Distress Electronic Information Systems
Policy made it clear that there was a possibility that third parties could
view the contents of its computers when it stated that, "the contents of
all communications and all information on the systems ... are subject to
review and use by ... third parties." (R. at Ex. A-1.) This mere possibility of a third party accessing the e-mail address book on Tekhead's computer destroyed any reasonable expectation of privacy he may have had
in it.
Therefore, even if this Court holds that personal jurisdiction over
Dospam was proper, Tekhead's claim of intrusion upon seclusion still
fails. Tekhead did not have an actual expectation that his e-mail address
book was secluded, and even if he did, this expectation would be unreasonable because the address book was not private. Therefore, this Court
should hold that the appellate court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Dospam as to Tekhead's claim of intrusion upon
seclusion.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set for above, Dospam respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the decision of the First District Court of Appeals denying
Dospam's motion for summary judgment as to jurisdiction and dismiss
this case. Alternatively, Dospam requests that this Court affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Dospam's motion for summary
judgment as to Tekhead's claims of intrusion upon seclusion and publicity placing him in a false light.
Respectfully submitted,

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT
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APPENDIX A:
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
Due Process Clause

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...
APPENDIX B:
MARSHALL REVISED CODE (WEST 2002)
SECTION 735 MRC 25-302
A tribunal of the State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person (or the personal representative of a deceased individual who would
be subject to jurisdiction under this section if not deceased) who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from
such person: (1) Transacting any business in this State ...
APPENDIX C:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977)
SECTION 652B
One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
APPENDIX D:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1977)
SECTION 652E
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places
the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to
the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed.
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